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Informing outsiders of the potential and quality of the organization in a way that 
will benefit the organization and avoid putting it at risk is a challenging task in 
competitive settings. Under conditions of uncertainty, in which external entities are 
imperfectly informed about the organization, outsiders will seek for signals of quality. 
Current research of interfirm signaling has focused on the sender’s ability to generate 
signals. In this dissertation, I propose that receivers of signals are heterogeneous in their 
ability to interpret signals and that this heterogeneity significantly influences the outcome 
of the interaction between signaler and interpreter. I apply this insight in an 
entrepreneurial setting to explain differences in signaling to venture capitalist and 
informal private equity investors (business angels) over the early stages of a firm’s 
lifecycle. The findings have strong implications for entrepreneurial firms’ strategy and, 
generally, to signaling theory.  
 
 
I argue that signals are multifaceted. Outsiders may base their decisions on two 
aspects of signal: the informative aspect, which relays direct information on the 
capabilities of the organization; and, the legitimizing aspect, which conveys legitimacy 
through actions of third-party entities. The use of each aspect is determined by the 
abilities of the sender to generate the signal and the receiver to interpret it. I posit that the 
informative aspect of the signal will be prominent when both the sender’s and the 
receiver’s abilities are high. When either the sender’s ability to generate a signal, or the 
receiver’s ability to interpret it, is limited, the legitimizing aspect of the signal will be 
prominent. When both the sender and the receiver possess low signaling abilities, the 
interpretation will be based on idiosyncratic data.  
 
This dissertation explores the differences between these two facets of signals, and 
the usefulness of each signal aspect when considering the organization’s target audience. 
The first essay explains the purpose of the two signal aspects for stakeholders and the 
recursive nature of interpretation. The two following essays test the theory by utilizing 
two large datasets of private equity investment solicitations. The second essay evaluates 
the effectiveness of the legitimizing aspect of the signal as a mechanism for screening 
startups’ funding solicitations. The third essay compares the informative and legitimizing 
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All organizations face the challenge of communicating effectively with external 
entities. This challenge is amplified in competitive settings since the organization is 
encouraged to create and maintain information asymmetry. Under conditions of 
uncertainty, when outsiders are imperfectly informed about the quality of the 
organization, they will infer this quality from signals they believe are correlated with the 
underlying quality of the organization (Spence, 1973). For the most part, organizational 
signaling research has focused on the organization’s ability to generate signals, signal 
typology, and the influence of different signal types on the decision-making of outsiders. 
To a large extent, the characteristics of outsiders, and the influence of these 
characteristics on the ability to interpret signals is ignored in previous research. In this 
dissertation I study the influence of the signal receivers’ characteristics on the utilization 
of signals. Considering the signal’s receivers allows for a more complete understanding 
of signals. A key realization is that the signal’s functionality is not necessarily singular. 
Rather, every signal contains multiple functions, both informative and legitimating in 
scope. The prominence a certain aspect of the signal has in influencing decision making 
depends on the interaction between the sender’s ability to generate the signals and the 




In order to understand how signals influence decision makers, one must consider 
the three parts of the interaction: the structure of the signal, the signaler, and the receiver. 
The signaler seeks to convey positive information and establish its legitimacy. Through 
signals, outsiders search for information that will reduce the degree of uncertainty in their 
interaction with the signaler. To this end, outsiders use two aspects of a signal: an 
informative aspect, which relays direct information regarding the capabilities of the 
signaler, and a legitimizing aspect in which the actions of third-party entities establish the 
credibility of the sender. In this dissertation I study how variance in receivers’ ability to 
interpret signals influences which aspect of the signal structure will be more influential in 
determining the outcome of the signaling interaction. 
 
This dissertation is structured into three essays. In the first essay I examine the 
structure of signals. I explain the purpose of the two aspects of the signal for stakeholders 
and the recursive nature of the relationship between these aspects. Additionally, I suggest 
a model which uses the interaction between the sender’s ability to generate a signal and 
the receiver’s ability to interpret the signal to predict which aspect of the signal will be 
most prominent in a sender-receiver interaction. I then test the suggested theory in two 
empirical essays, which follow thereafter.  
Institutional theory suggests organizations operate simultaneously in two types of 
environments—technical and institutional (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1992). Since 
signals serve to communicate between organizations, to be effective the signal’s structure 
must match the environment in which the organizations operate. The informative aspect 
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of the signal conveys the signaling organization’s ability to create and exchange its 
products. Derived from observable decisions of the organization, the informative aspect 
of the signal gives a direct and codifiable indication of the organization’s capabilities. 
Thus, when the informative aspect of the signal is the prominent aspect it serves to reduce 
information asymmetry between the sender and receiver. The legitimizing aspect of the 
signal qualifies the organization’s reputation to the outsider. Derived from visible actions 
and decisions made by third-party entities with regards to the organization, the 
legitimizing aspect of the signal provides an indirect indication of the sender’s underlying 
quality and serves to establish the sender and his actions. Thus, when the legitimizing 
aspect of the signal is the prominent aspect it serves to reduce uncertainty (or at least give 
the perception of lower uncertainty). It should be pointed out that this separation of the 
signal into informative and legitimizing aspects is recursive. Thus, the legitimizing aspect 
has an informational component to it and the validity of the informative aspect is 
determined by its conformity to institutional norms. One needs only to consider Spence’s 
classical job market example (1973) to realize this structural phenomenon. The 
candidate’s resume is the signal in this case, and its informative aspect is the education 
and past experiences outlined therein. The legitimizing aspect is realized through the 
applicant’s adherence to the resume writing norms of the relevant industry. If, as Spence 
did in his example, we focus on the educational background, which is one level ‘down’ 
the recursion, the degree and accomplishments of the candidate are the informative aspect 
at this level while the reputation of the degree-giving institution serves as the legitimizing 
aspect. Obviously, the number of potential recurrence levels depends on the complexity 
of the original signal. Understanding the recursive nature of the signal’s structure may 
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explain how “deep” the receiver will search before finding the actual signal that allows 
her to make a decision. 
 
As stated by Spence (1973), the sender’s abilities are negatively correlated to the 
cost of generating a signal of quality. The same logic can be implemented regarding the 
quantity of signals a sender can generate, i.e. the sender’s abilities are negatively 
correlated to the cost of sending multiple signals. These statements implicitly assume all 
receivers are identical in their ability to interpret the signal(s). If one would reverse the 
focus of Spence’s statement from the sender to the receiver, the falsity of the assumption 
of similarity would be revealed. Thus, to distinguish between receivers on the ability to 
interpret the signal, the cost of interpreting the signal must be negatively correlated to the 
receiver’s ability. Additionally, the cost of interpreting multiple signals must be 
negatively correlated to the receiver’s ability. Otherwise, all senders would be motivated 
to invest in the signal to the same extent so that receivers would fail to distinguish 
between them based on the signal.  
 
Consider the simplest segmentation into high and low abilities. A sender with a 
high level of signaling abilities will generate more signals, while a low level signaler will 
produce fewer signals. Similarly, a receiver with higher interpretation abilities will be 
able to utilize more from each received signal. Hence the receiver will have more 
potential information to interpret from the sender with high abilities; however, the 
usefulness of the signal depends on the receiver’s abilities. Thus, it is not clear that a 
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higher number of signals is always beneficial for the low level receiver. In fact, one can 
easily come up with a scenario where such an example would end with information 
overload. Rather, I suggest the four different combinations of sender’s and receiver’s 
abilities in each of the quadrants determine the prominence of signal aspect. When both 
the sender’s and the receiver’s abilities are high, the technical aspect of the signal, which 
provides direct information about the organization, will be prominent in influencing the 
receiver’s decision. When the sender’s abilities are low and the receiver’s abilities are 
high, or when the sender abilities are high and the receiver's abilities are low, the 
legitimizing aspect of the signal will be prominent in influencing the receiver’s decision. 
When both parties’ abilities are low the decision will be based upon idiosyncratic 
information, thus no conclusions can be made regarding future decisions of the receiver 
or about the sender himself. 
 
In the first empirical essay (Chapter 3), I evaluate how the legitimizing aspect of 
the signal influences decision making by a receiver with limited signal interpretation 
abilities. Studies have identified social ties, business concept, the entrepreneur’s 
capabilities, and the general fit with the VC’s preferences (Hall and Hofer, 1993; 
MacMillan et al., 1985; Shane and Cable, 2002; Shepherd, 1999) as the criteria VCs use 
to select which startups to fund. VC firms sift through hundreds of proposals a year while 
funding only a handful of startups (Goldfarb et al., 2005; Metrick, 2007). In VCs, usually 
a small group of partners makes all of the investment decisions. Hence, the attention of 
the venture partners is a scarce resource and its allocation is central to the success of the 
VC. I argue that due to their limited attention resources at the screening stage, VCs’ 
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decision makers focus on the legitimizing aspect of the received signals. Since social 
mediation is both observable and legitimizing (Podolny, 1994) it will be used as a 
selection criterion at the initial selection screen.  
 
I use the attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997) to study the influence of 
network ties as a solicitation mechanism on VC’s initial screening of solicitations. I test 
my hypotheses by using a large sample of funding solicitations from a single VC firm 
(hereafter the Focal VC) over a period of two years. I observe the soliciting startups’ 
signal, which includes the social network, the submitted documentation type and content, 
the Focal VC initial reaction to the signal, and, whether the startup was funded. The data 
include the solicitation characteristics as recorded by the Focal VC. Hence, the data 
represents the Focal VC’s decisions in situ. This setting enables me to test the proposition 
that a limitation in the receiver’s abilities to interpret signals will enhance the usefulness 
of the legitimizing aspect of the signal by identifying which cue influences the VC’s 
decisions at the initial stage of the funding process. 
 
In this setting the network tie for which the solicitation referral is attributed acts 
as the legitimizing aspect of the signal, while the informative aspect of the signal consists 
of the documents submitted in the solicitation package. Social mediation occurs when an 
investment opportunity is referred to a venture capitalist by a third party with prior ties to 
the investor. I observe both direct and indirect social interaction as the result of social 
referrals. Direct referrals occur when an intermediary introduces the startup and the VC 
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prior to the submission of an investment solicitation. In indirect referrals a third party 
submits the solicitation to the VC before a direct interaction takes place. Both 
introduction types constitute endorsements and confer legitimacy. 
 
I show that due to severe constraints on the availability of attention resources at 
the VC’s screening stage the legitimizing aspect of the signal takes prominence in 
influencing the decision. Moreover, I show that having a direct network tie between the 
startup and the VC prior to the solicitation of funding, which creates an opportunity for 
transferring additional alternative information, is more influential than any other type of 
social referral. Additionally, I test in this chapter the proposition that variance in the 
receiver’s ability will influence the importance of the legitimizing aspect. I proxy the 
VC’s available attention resources for screening incoming solicitations by measuring the 
workload of the VC. The results are in the opposite direction to the suggested hypotheses. 
 
In the second empirical essay (Chapter 4), I test how the informational and 
legitimizing aspects of the signal influence the decisions of different types of receivers. I 
suggest that the greater the similarity between the signaler and the receiver the greater the 
influence of the informative aspect of the signal. I use the structural differences between 
private equity investors’ types to determine which aspect of the signal will be prominent 
in influencing their investment decisions. Due to the inherent information asymmetry 
between young startups and private equity investors, and the uncertainty of investment 
outcome, potential investors tend to ignore some of the information the startup provides 
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due to concerns of omission or misrepresentation (Spence, 1976). One of the main 
methods startups use to provide information early in the solicitation process is to submit 
planning documentation, such as business plans, to the solicited investors (Kirsch, 
Goldfarb, & Gera, 2009; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  
 
The third study utilizes a separate dataset of startups’ funding solicitations from 
both angel and venture capital investors. When reading the submitted documents, 
investors may treat statements regarding the potential of the venture cautiously and 
search for valid alternative signals of value (Downes & Heinkel, 1982; Spence, 1973). In 
top echelon research, studies of Top Management Team (TMT) and Board of Directors 
(BOD) structures suggest that the structure and composition of the firm’s top echelon 
serves both as a resource and as a signal of legitimacy to potential investors. While both 
TMT and BOD description is usually part of the documentations startups submit to 
potential investors, its verifiable nature makes it useful for reducing information 
asymmetry. The fact that most of the information within the biodata of top echelon 
members consists of past experiences to the soliciting venture turns it into an alternative 
signal to the quality of the venture. Extant research has shown investors rely on 
management and board size and composition as a valuable signal when deciding on IPO 
investments. Top echelon structure affect the success of an IPO through recruiting 
prestigious underwriters (Higgins & Gulati, 2003), influencing the IPO’s underpricing 
(Cohen & Dean, 2005), IPO size (Finkle, 1998), IPO performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 




I use the differences in the solicitation documentation, and in particular the 
differences in description of the top echelon, to study how the informational and 
legitimizing aspects of the signal attract different types of investors, specifically angel 
investors and VCs. The definition of angel investors in the literature ranges from 
successful entrepreneurs who cashed in to affluent individuals with no prior experience in 
venture investing (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 1994; Lerner, 1998). According to this 
definition, angel investors differ from venture capitalists in terms of experience, expertise 
and preferred investment size. I assert that the differences between angel investors and 
venture capital firms make different aspects of the signal more effective to one group 
over the other. Specifically, I suggest that angels’ investment decisions are more likely to 
be influenced by the informative aspect of the signal than VC investment decisions. 
Brought together, my theory suggests signals are target specific. The results show that 






 THE MULTIFACETED AND RECURSIVE NATURE OF 
SIGNALS’ STRUCTURE AND THE INFLUENCE OF 




This essay studies how the interaction between the ability of the sender to generate a 
signal and the ability of the receiver to interpret the signal determine how the signal will 
be used. I define two aspects of the signal for stakeholders and review their interactive 
and recursive nature. Outsiders can base their decisions on two aspects of signal: the 
technical aspect, which relays direct information on the capabilities of the organization, 
and, the legitimizing aspect, which conveys legitimacy through actions of third-party 
entities. Current research ignores the influence of receivers’ heterogeneity on a signal’s 
effectiveness. I argue that the interaction between the sender’s ability to generate signals 
and the ability of receiver to interpret signals determines which aspect of the signal will 
be prominent. I develop a model of this interaction and propositions for empirical testing. 
The proposed theory suggests that, independent of the sender’s underlying quality, the 
receiver’s capabilities to discern this quality are significant in determining the signal’s 
influence on the receiver’s decision. Thus, in effect, signals are target specific.  
 





No firm is an island, to paraphrase John Donne. Firms interact and communicate 
with their stakeholders all the time and must do so in order to thrive. These interactions 
often take the form of signals, i.e. communiqués that relay particular information with a 
specific intention. Signaling the potential and quality of the firm to outsiders is a 
significant challenge in competitive setting. On one hand the signal has to convey 
valuable information to be effective (Spence, 1973), but on the other hand the signal 
should not reveal too much information (Heil & Robertson, 1991). The task of 
determining how much information to reveal is even more significant when considering 
nascent firms. Mature firms can generate a plethora of information for outsiders to 
analyze. Examples of available information range from historic and recent stock 
performance for public firms, professional investment analysis and new coverage, to 
visible firm actions such as product announcements, M&A activity, the release of letters 
to investors, SEC filings, press releases and media coverage (Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990; Shepherd, 1999; Zuckerman, 1999). Only a few of these sources are available to 
entities interested in younger organizations at the Initial Public Offering (IPO) stage 
(Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) and even less is available to private equity investors and 
others interested in nascent organizations (Shepherd, 1999; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). As 
an organization develops and progresses through the organizational life cycle from birth 
through growth to maturity (Quinn & Cameron, 1983), it will accumulate private and 
public evidence of potential. However, external parties with interests in nascent 
organizations are forced to rely more heavily on statements made by the entrepreneur. 
Given that young startups typically have fewer, if any, measurable achievements and they 
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often operate in new industries, these statements are generally more difficult to verify. 
The inherent information asymmetry in the interaction can cause concerns for 
misrepresentation and omission (Akerlof, 1970) which can hinder the startup’s attempt to 
attract necessary resources from outsiders.1 To overcome the scarcity of information, 
outsiders will search for alternative signals (Spence, 1973). 
 
Signaling theory states that a signal is a course of action that conveys information 
to an external entity by systematically varying with the signaler’s quality. The 
effectiveness of a signal depends on the inherent credibility of that signal. Specifically, 
for the signal to be valuable it must be costly to obtain and difficult to imitate (Spence, 
1976). The theory suggests that the higher the quality of the sending startup the cheaper it 
will be it to generate the signal. If several startups are trying to solicit funds from an 
external investor, the startup with the highest quality will be able to generate a signal of 
threshold effectiveness at a lower cost than the other startups. Hence, for each receiver of 
the signal, the sender’s cost of generating a signal is negatively correlated to the sender’s 
reputation (Podolny, 1993; Shapiro, 1982, 1983). Under conditions of information 
asymmetry, decision makers facing uncertain outcomes tend to mistrust and therefore 
ignore information supplied directly by the opposing side (Downes & Heinkel, 1982). 
When investors cannot ascertain the value of a venture from its actions, they will search 
for signals of quality (Spence, 1973). For instance, rather than evaluating the product 
design from a startup, institutional acceptance, via the participation of prominent actors in 
                                                 
1 In this work I treat information asymmetry as if resulting from the entrepreneur’s optimism and naivety. 
Since information asymmetry is considered as given, the inclusion of agency considerations will not 
enhance the theoretical discussion. Therefore I take a positive (and naïve) point of view.  
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the specification of the relevant standards, can be a useful signal for a potential investor 
(Podolny, 1993). Research shows that to alleviate uncertainty, outsiders use both 
informational and institutional signals at the IPO stage (Downes et al., 1982) and for 
mature firms (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Current scholarly discussion treats these 
signals as separate classes. Moreover, scholars have explicitly indicated the greater 
importance of institutional as opposed to other types of signals (Oliver, 1991; Podolny, 
1993). However, this classification of signals into two or three broad types ignores the 
fact that these “separate” signal types are actually derived from a single source and are 
therefore actually aspects of a single signal. The signaling typology also masks the 
underlying heterogeneity of the sender and the receiver. This heterogeneity determines 
the relative importance of informative and institutional signals.  
 
Theory and Background  
As mentioned before, the sender’s abilities are negatively correlated to the cost of 
generating a signal of quality (Spence, 1973). The same logic can be implemented 
regarding the quantity of signals a sender can generate, i.e., at any given level of expense, 
a signaler of higher quality will be able to produce a larger number of signals than a 
signaler of lower quality. Thus, sender’s abilities are also negatively correlated to the cost 
of sending multiple signals. So far, the statements focused only on the abilities of sender. 
This suggests an implicitly assumption that receivers possess similar abilities to interpret 
signals. For the most part this inherent assumption regarding the homogeneity of signal 
receivers is ignored in research. Only a couple of studies consider the capabilities of the 
receiving side—even then the consideration is surprisingly limited. In his review of 25 
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years of signaling theory research in the field of economics, Riley’s (2001) only reference 
to the role of receivers is that more capable receivers are theorized to act sooner than less 
capable receivers. In their work on signals between competitors, Heil and Robertson 
(1991) propose that the more capable a receiver is in generating signals the higher the 
number of relevant signals he will identify and interpret correctly as a receiver, and, that 
higher similarity between sender and receiver will increase the accuracy of signal 
interpretation. In these propositions the signaling interaction is based on the sender or the 
abilities of the receiver as a sender. However, in many, if not most, signaling interactions 
the receivers’ signal interpretation abilities have no relation with their signal generating 
abilities. Clearly, the role of the receiver in the signaling interaction has not been 
explored to the same degree as the role of the signaler. Nor do these propositions suggest 
how the heterogeneity of receivers influences the preference for, or the interpretation of, 
informational and institutional signals. Admittedly, the assumption of receivers’ 
homogeneity is not without benefit; it serves to simplify the interaction, allowing the 
researcher to focus her attention and reach deeper understandings of the signaler while 
assisting in the management of experiments, natural and laboratory. However, the falsity 
of the receivers’ homogeneity assumption can be easily revealed. To start considering the 
influence of the receiver’s signal interpretation abilities on the signaling interaction, one 
only needs to switch the focus of Spence’s original job market propositions from the 
sender to the receiver, i.e. the interpretation abilities of the receivers’ vary with their 
quality while the senders’ abilities are homogeneous. Using this reversed focus on the 
signaling interaction provides a solid starting point for studying the role of receivers. In 
this scenario the higher the interpretation ability of the receiver, then easier it will be for 
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him to identify the relevant signal and interpret it accurately. Thus, the cost of 
interpreting the signal is negatively correlated to the receiver’s ability. In the same 
manner, the cost of interpreting multiple signals is negatively correlated to the receiver’s 
ability. To cement the appropriateness of these assumptions, let us consider the opposite 
situation. If the assumptions of receivers’ heterogeneity do not hold, then all receivers 
will interpret the signals in the same manner, i.e. they will have the same probability of 
interpreting the signal correctly regardless of their signaling interpretation capabilities. 
This will lead to competitive parity among receivers. At the extreme receivers will only 
be able to distinguish between those with or without a signal but will not be able to rate 
or differentiate between signals and signalers. This will encourage all signalers to 
generate the same signal, the minimal indication noticeable by the receivers, regardless of 
the cost to generating said signal. This case may create a “lemons’ problem (Akerlof, 
1970). Assume the interpreter will not be able to differentiate between the signaler with 
high quality and the one with low quality based on the signal. Thus, all signalers will 
appear to the receiver to be of the same quality. Due to this interpretation homogeneity 
more capable senders will not be able to secure higher returns based in their signal. 
Additionally, with interpretation homogeneity the senders will not be able to distinguish 
between receivers, i.e. the sender will not be able to identify which of the receivers 
rewards her for being of higher quality. If this fact is understood by the high quality 
sender she may lose her motivation to generate the signal altogether, leaving signaling 
only to signalers with lower quality, which will cause the signaling market to fail. Thus, it 
becomes clear that for the signaling interaction to function both senders and receivers of 




Accordingly, the following discussion assumes that both senders and receivers 
vary, respectively, in their abilities to generate and interpret signals and that these 
abilities are negatively correlated to the cost of creating and utilizing the signals. 
Furthermore, I argue that the utilization of a signal depends on the location of the sender-
receiver dyad on the combined ability map. Specifically, the determination of which 
aspect of the signal, informative or legitimizing, will grab the receiver’s attention and 
facilitate his decision depends on both the receiver’s and the sender’s abilities. That is, 
signals are targeted to specific audiences. 
 
The informative and legitimizing aspects of signals 
Institutional theory suggests organizations operate simultaneously in two types of 
environments—technical and institutional (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1992). Since 
signals serve to communicate between organizations, to be effective the signal will have 
aspects corresponding with the environments in which the organizations operate. In their 
technical environments organizations concentrate on their structure and procedures, 
buffer their processes from external influence, and are rewarded for being effective and 
efficient (Scott, 1991). By definition, in their technical environment, organizations 
produce and exchange a product or service in a market. Thus, the part of the signal that 
conveys direct information about the firm’s structure, procedures, and products serves to 
inform the receiver of the technical aspect of the organization. This informative aspect of 
the signal communicates direct and factual data. For example, in the informative aspect a 
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startup will convey to the receiver the venture’s ability to create and exchange its 
products through the description of its R&D plan and its planned manufacturing routine. 
 
This informative aspect derives from the organization’s observable actions, 
decisions, evidence of the formation of organizational structure, and/or the codification of 
routines. The informative aspect of the signal gives a direct, codified and explicit 
indication of the capabilities of the organization. Since signals serve to alleviate 
information asymmetry under conditions of uncertainty, the informative aspect of the 
signal provides the signal interpreter with additional information about the sender. The 
directness of the informative aspect assists the receiver with forming an opinion about the 
sender. For example, when soliciting funds startups typically submit potential investors 
with documents that provide background information about the venture and its founders. 
These documents, typically in the form of business plans or executive summaries, 
describe the market in which the startup operates, identifies competitors and potential 
customers, defines the product’s value proposition and may include description of the 
founders’ education, professional experience, and significant achievements. The biodata 
increases the interpreter’s knowledge of the capabilities of the founders and the other 
sections describe the structure of the venture and provide information on the product. 
Thus, by providing direct and codifiable indications of the quality of the sender, the role 
of the informative aspect of the signal is to allow the receiver to evaluate information that 
otherwise would be difficult to attain. Formally: 
Proposition 1: The informative aspect of the signal reduces the information 




In institutional environments, organizations are subjected to isomorphising 
processes and conform to rules and requirements in order to receive support and 
legitimacy (Scott, 1991). The rules’ source can be coercive, mimetic, or, normative 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer et al., 1977). Regardless of source, to be rewarded in 
with a stamp of approval the organization must conform to the prevailing norms in their 
institutional environment. Research of institutional signals has shown that signals, which 
convey status, legitimacy and acceptance, have a positive influence on performance 
(Stuart, 1999; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Zott and Huy, 2007). I suggest that these are not 
separate signals but rather a different aspect of the same signal. Hence, this legitimizing 
aspect of the signal qualifies the organization’s reputation for the signal interpreter. The 
legitimizing aspect of the signal is derived from observable actions and decisions of 
third-party entities with regards to the organization. To accept the signal as credible an 
outsider who focuses on the legitimizing aspect of the signal must assume that the 
decision of the third-party entity was either based on valid information that is not 
currently available in the signal’s informative aspect, or, that the third-party’s analytical 
skills are superior. In the solicitation package to potential investors, startups often 
describe their advisory board and board of directors. The ability to affiliate the venture 
with prominent outsiders is a strong legitimizing signal for nascent organizations 
(Stinchcombe, 1965). Moreover, descriptions of validating actions by external entities 
such as awards won, validation of adherence to industry standards, and even the securing 
of patents all confer legitimacy to the startup. In addition, the form in which the 
informative aspect was submitted can legitimize the sender. For example, a startup whose 
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PowerPoint presentation to VC partners adheres to Guy Kawasaki’s 10/20/30 rule (2005) 
is signaling to its immediate audience that it is at the appropriate stage for VC funding. 
Therefore, the legitimizing aspect of the signal provides indirect and tacit indication of 
the sender’s underlying quality and serves to validate the sender and his actions. Since 
signals intend to assuage information asymmetry under conditions of uncertainty, the 
legitimizing aspect of the signal qualifies the signal’s information for the receiver. The 
indirectness of the legitimizing aspect serves to establish the sender’s reputation. Thus, 
when the legitimizing aspect of the signal is the prominent aspect, it serves to reduce the 
ambiguity of future interactions with the sender by validating the sender and the 
information within her signal. 
 
Proposition 2: The legitimizing aspect of the signal reduces the perceived 
ambiguousness of the sender’s quality. 
 
The recursive nature of signal interpretation  
The previous arguments suggest that signals are multifaceted and that each signal 
facet answers a specific need for the receiver. The combined effect of both aspects allows 
the interpreter to overcome the information asymmetry in the relationship and the 
uncertainty in his decision outcome. Once the two aspects of the signal are recognized 
one must consider the relationship between them. One difficulty with the description of 
signals as multifaceted is determining where one facet ends and the next one begins. In 
fact, one can argue that what is legitimizing for one interpreter may be informative for 
another. For example, Higgins and Gulati (2003, 2006) have studied how the past 
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experiences of a startup’s top echelon, described in the IPO prospectus, legitimize the 
startup’s IPO to underwriters and potential investors. Let us consider these managerial 
backgrounds at an earlier stage in the startup’s life. It is well known that VCs take an 
active role in appointing (and often replacing) of the startup’s top management team. 
Conservatively, we can assume that at least one of the members of startup’s top echelon 
was approved, introduced, or recruited for the startup by the VC. At such a time, when 
the manger was reviewed by the VC partner for a position in the startup, the same past 
experiences, described this time in her CV, helped the recruiter to evaluate if she had the 
necessary skills and knowledge for the position. Thus, the same information that was 
legitimizing for the IPO underwriters and investors served as the informative aspect of 
the signal for the VC. The reason that a particular facet of the signal can be viewed as 
either informative or legitimizing by different signal receivers is that signals can be 
interpreted recursively. 
 
Recursion is a method of defining functions in which the function being defined is 
applied within its own definition. This simply means that a recursive function is a 
function that one of its options is calling itself with a subset of the original input. The 
recursive characteristic of the signal’s structure can be demonstrated using the previously 
described example of a startup soliciting funding from a VC (see Figure 2.1 for a graphic 
illustration of the following description). To begin the solicitation the startup submits its 
solicitation documents as the signal. To simplify the description of the interpretation I 
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assume that the VC can focus its attention on just one of the aspects at any given time2. 
The startup can submit the documents using an intermediate social network node who 
will refer the solicitation or over the transom. At this stage, the social reference is the 
legitimizing aspect of the signal and the solicitation documentation is the informative 
aspect. At this stage we have two passable paths going one level deeper into the 
recursion: the VC can choose either the solicitation’s documents or the method in which 
these documents were submitted. Let us assume the VC has decided to follow the 
informative aspect of the signal. First the VC needs to decide if this aspect, i.e. the 
method of submitting the solicitation is sufficient to make a decision. If so, the function 
ends with either a positive or a negative ruling. If the informative aspect was necessary 
but not sufficient the VC will analyze the aspect (documentation) as a signal. At this level 
the document type is the legitimizing aspect of the signal while the topics of data 
contained within the documentation is the informative aspect. Again, the VC will decide 
which aspect is more relevant and if this aspect is sufficient for making a decision. Let us 
assumes that this time the informative aspect was selected again and that, again, the 
aspect was necessary but not sufficient. As figure 2.1 describes, we can continue in this 
path, selecting the legitimizing aspect at the next two stages (Board of Directors and 
Education Institution). At this point the VC learns that the startup has connections to 
Stanford University, which, in this particular example, is a necessary and sufficient 
legitimizing signal, thus, the signal interpretation function will return Stanford as the 
signal influencing its decision.  
                                                 
2 Obviously, it is possible for the VC (and any other signal interpreter) to attend to both aspects of the 
signal. Appendix 2A contains a more formalized version of the simple recursive function Signal 




Insert Figure 2.1 about here 
====================== 
The challenge, resulting from the multifaceted and multilayered structure of the 
signal, is determining which recursive atom the signal receiver will use to base his 
decision. I suggest that the receiver’s ability to interpret the signal will determine the 
direction and depth of the signal used to make the decision. In their theory of competitive 
market signaling, Heil and Robertson (1991) propose that signaling ability of the signal 
receivers determines their ability to identify signals. Additionally they propose that the 
higher the similarity between the signaler and the interpreter the higher the accuracy of 
the interpretation. Similarly I, propose that a) the higher the receiver’s interpretation 
ability the higher the number of recursions he can take into the signal, and, b) the higher 
the similarity between the signaler and the receiver the higher the likelihood that the 
receiver will base his decision on the informative aspect of the signal.  
 
The influence of receivers’ heterogeneity on signal interpretation 
In their study on how informational, institutional, and strategic signals build the 
reputation of firms, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) suggest that different stakeholders 
attend to different features of firms’ actions. They show that external publics construct 
the reputations of firms on the basis of information about the firms and the firms’ relative 
structural positions within organizational field. One limitation of the study is that 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990) do not discuss the significant correlations found between 
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separate signals, specifically between informational and institutional signals. As 
discussed earlier, this separation appears artificial and dependent on the study’s data 
structure. In this study the separation of the signal into different types is instrumental in 
establishing the importance of institutional aspects of firms’ behavior to the creation of 
(positive) reputation. Another limitation of that study is that it focused squarely on the 
sender’s abilities to generate signals and did not consider the abilities of the receivers to 
interpret the signals. Scott and Meyer (1991) propose that organizations will succeed in 
their technical and institutional environments to the extent that they are able to acquire 
types of personnel, develop structural arrangements and production processes that create 
efficient productions activities, and conform to the specifications of established norms in 
that sector. In a signaling context, an organization that possesses or develops higher 
signaling abilities will be more successful in its technical and institutional environments. 
This, of course, is true for the organization generating the signal as well as the one 
interpreting it.  
 
According to Heil and Robertson (1991) the receiver’s interpretation ability 
depends mainly on the receiver’s experience. They suggest that experienced receivers can 
be considered as experts, i.e. possessing higher signaling interpretation capabilities. 
Additionally, they suggest that similarity between the sender and the receiver increases 
the accuracy of signal interpretation. An expert receiver should be familiar with the 
environment in which he operates and have a better understanding of the factors 
contributing to success. A receiver who knows and understands the environment will be 
familiar with the legitimizing opportunities in the startup’s market. Arguably, such a 
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receiver will be familiar with the social network and will be more centrally located than a 
lesser receiver would be. The receiver’s experience should also allow him to both 
understand the informative aspect of the signal and quantify the legitimizing aspect of the 
signal more accurately. On the other hand, similarity between the signaler and receiver, 
or shorter distance, means the receiver has more relevant knowledge of what is needed 
for the signaler to be successful. Hence, a closer receiver is less dependent on 
legitimizing actions of third parties, which should allow her to better understand the 
informative aspect of the signal. Thus, expertise should help the receiver in interpreting 
both aspects of the signal, while similarity should assist the interpreter in evaluating the 
informative aspect. For the purpose of this study I consider interpretation ability as the 
combination of both expertise and ‘distance’. Building on Heil and Robertson (1991) I 
suggest that signal receivers with higher abilities will be able to interpret more signals at 
any given time and do so more accurately. Incorporating the recursive nature of signal 
interpretation I propose:  
 
Proposition 3: The higher the signal interpretation abilities of the receiver the 
deeper he will be able to delve in the signal. 
 
Consider the simplest segmentation into high and low levels of signaling abilities. 
At a certain cost level, a sender with a high level of signaling ability will generate more 
signals, while a sender with a lower signaling ability will produce fewer signals. 
Similarly, a receiver with higher signaling interpretation abilities will be able to utilize 
more from each received signal. Together, the four combinations of sender’s and 
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receiver’s abilities in each of the quadrants determine the prominence of signal aspect. 
Thus, the four different sender-receiver signaling abilities dyads suggest that signals are 
target specific. In the following section I elaborate on each of the four dyads and propose 
how the signals are structured and utilized. To assist the discussion on the usefulness of 
the signal’s informational and legitimizing aspects, the following sections will utilize 
more examples of private equity investment decisions in nascent organizations as the 
facilitator for the creation and utilization of signals. Investment decisions are a particular 
instance of interfirm interaction in which the receiver’s decision is based on the signals 
she receives from the sender. Early stage investment decisions are useful mechanisms to 
study the effectiveness of the aspects of signals because they are visible, distinct, 
measurable, and, can be anchored in time. Focusing on the entrepreneurial stage of the 
organizational life cycle (Kimberly, 1980) and the inherent scarcity of information helps 
to distinguish which of the used signal’s aspects is more prominently reflected in a given 
decision.  
 
High signal generating and receiving abilities 
Extant research of signaling at the IPO stage shows that startups benefit from both 
aspects of the signal. Ventures used the informative aspect of signals to relay direct 
information to investors such as the proportion of equity ownership retained by 
entrepreneurs (Downes et al., 1982), top management team abilities (Shepherd, 1999), the 
achievement of milestones (Eckhardt, Shane, & Delmar, 2006), and the role of past 
experiences of the top management team (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). Studies have also 
demonstrated how startups use institutional signals to gain legitimacy such as the 
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prominence of strategic alliance partners (Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999) or the prestige 
of the IPO underwriters (Higgins & Gulati, 2003). However, these studies also point to 
the dependency of the legitimizing aspect upon the informative aspect (Higgins et al., 
2003; Podolny, 1993) which may suggest that at more advanced stages of the 
organizational life cycle signals are likely to have higher recursion levels.  
 
Signals are observable attributes of the underlying quality of the signal sending 
organization (Spence, 1973). The main function of signals is to communicate information 
to the receiver and build a reputation for the sender (Fombrun and Shanley., 1990; 
Shapiro, 1982, 1983) . The ability of the sender to generate multiple signals at more 
advanced stages of the organizational life cycle reduces the receiver’s concern that the 
information communicated in the informative aspect of the signal is due to noise. Thus 
the proliferation of signals reduces the ambiguity of the signals and with it the need for 
indirect legitimacy. Since the goal of the receiver is to gather as much information as 
possible from the signals to alleviate the information asymmetry between her and the 
sender, when the sender’s signaling ability is high, if the receiver’s signaling 
interpretation ability is also high, the receiver will concentrate her efforts on the 
informative aspect of the signals. 
 
Proposition 4: When both the sender’s signal generating and the receiver’s 
interpretation abilities are high, the direct informative aspect of signals will be more 




Low signal generating ability – High signal interpretation ability 
Research focusing on pre-IPO stage ventures suggest that venture capitalists 
utilize both aspects of the signal (Shepherd, 1999). However, unlike studies of IPO’s, 
which focus on a well defined time frame, studies of venture capital investments 
generally fail to correlate the used signal to an exact time frame within the investment 
selection process. Therefore it is difficult to determine from these studies the relative 
importance of the aspects of each signal within the venture capital selection process.  
 
As the firm matures signals are more likely to be performance related and 
therefore the firm will be able to produce multiple signals. Moreover, these signals’ 
structure will be complex, i.e. each aspect can be recursively analyzed as signal. Hence, 
for mature firms any individual signal aspect may effectively proxy another. This is not 
necessarily the case at earlier stages. Due to the increased level of uncertainty and the 
scarcity of relevant information, an individual signal aspect might not provide the 
receiver with sufficient information at pre IPO stages. To give an effective signal a 
venture must emit a signal in which the legitimizing aspect enhances, or even masks, the 
informative aspect. In previous work, Kirsch, Goldfarb and Gera (2008) found that VCs 
use business plans as an institutional signal serving a ceremonial role, rather than as an 
informational signal serving a communicative role. Assume that the startup is aware of a 
normative requirement of submitting business plans when soliciting funds from a venture 
capitalist. This suggests that although the startup attempted to produce an informational 
signal the outside observer might ignore the informative aspect of the signal due to 
uncertainty while recognizing the effort to produce the signal as an effort to conform to 
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the norms governing the institutional environment. Alternatively, since nascent 
organizations lack track records their signals are more ambiguous than the signals of 
mature organizations. In particular, young ventures have untested capabilities and the 
match between their internal structure and the environment is unclear. Moreover, the 
inherent uncertainty in exploring new markets - often the domain of new ventures - is 
high. As the venture matures the more information arrives, and this information quality 
improves. Thus, in the aforementioned example, the external observer’s interpretation 
expertise allows her to recognize that at such an early stage the accuracy of the 
information within the business plan is limited; however, the effort to formalize the 
venture structure and procedures stands as an indicator of relative maturity and therefore 
as a legitimizing signal.  
 
When moving backwards, toward earlier stages of the venture’s life when 
information is relatively sparse, the increased uncertainty of the startup’s future enhances 
the need for the legitimizing aspect of the signal to compensate for the limited data within 
the informative aspect (Podolny, 1994). Thus I propose that at earlier stages of venture 
life when uncertainty is high, the legitimizing aspect of the signal will be used to validate 
the venture and will be more prominent then the informative aspect of the signal. 
Proposition 5: The relative scarcity of signals will enhance the prominence of 




High signal generating ability – Low signal interpreting ability 
In the third dyad, the sender’s high signal generating ability creates a significant 
number of signals, yet the external observer does not have the ability to interpret the 
signals. This inability can result from lower interpretation expertise, lack of analysis 
capabilities or lack of attention resources (Ocasio, 1997), or it can stem from the receiver 
being dissimilar to the signaler—for example, a hedge fund who invests in an IPO as part 
of its portfolio. Instead of investing her attention resources on the taxing evaluation of 
informational signals the external observer will wait for a third-party, an entity external to 
the dyad, to endorse the signaler, and then act on this legitimizing indirect aspect of the 
signal. For example, the fund can check which investment bank is underwriting the IPO 
(Higgins and Gulati, 2003). The receiver assumes that the third-party is privy to the 
signal she received, if not more. As the receiver values the reputation of the third-party, 
its signal-based decision qualifies the information embedded within the informative 
aspect. In effect the legitimizing aspect replaces the informative aspect for the receiver. 
Since the receiver delays her decision and makes it dependent on action by a third-party 
entity, she should expect to garner a lower return on her investment. The receiver hopes 
to compensate for her loses in terms of return on investment due to its delayed entry and 
secondary position by reducing its expenses and risk.  
 
Thus I propose that receivers who are not intimately knowledgeable about young 
ventures and/or do not have the ability to spend the attention to become knowledgeable 
will base their decisions on the legitimizing aspect of signals even in the presence of 
multiple signals with an adequate informative aspect. 
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Proposition 6: Receivers with lower signal interpretation abilities will base their 
decision on the legitimizing aspect of the signal. 
 
Low signal generating and signal interpretation abilities 
At first glance the last quadrant may appear unimportant. If the sender can only 
generate limited signals and the receiver’s abilities of interpreting these few and far 
between signals are limited or non existent then no investment decisions will be made. 
This impression is misleading, as the evidence showing investments of family and friends 
at the very first stage of the organizational life cycle (Kimberly, 1980) suggests that this 
communication dyad does facilitate investment decisions. While the case for investment-
relevant communication is limited or even non existent, there is a case for other, possibly 
idiosyncratic, communication within the dyad. In fact, the closer the dyadic members are 
to each other personally, the higher the level of information the receiver has on the 
sender. This personal familiarity might substitute professional similarity. In a study of 
similar settings, Sorenson and Waguespack (2006) show that film distributors prefer 
carrying films involving key personnel with whom they had prior relations; moreover, 
they tend to favor these filmmakers when allocating scarce resources such as opening 
dates and promotion efforts. The study also found that relationship-based decisions 
yielded poor results. Thus, while such idiosyncratic signals may be useful for a single 
interaction they do not increase the receiver’s expertise for a repeated game scenario. 
 
Proposition 7: When both the sender’s ability to generate signals and the 
receiver’s signal interpretation abilities are low, neither aspect of the investment-related 
signal will facilitate the decision, rather, the receiver will base her decision on 









This study takes a new look at the structure of interfirm signaling. To understand 
the structure of signals I started with examining the environments in which organizations 
act. The premise that organizations interact in two parallel environments (Scott, 1991), or 
perhaps dimensions, implies that the signals exchanged between organizations will 
correspond with both technical and institutional dimensions. Prior research has shown 
several types of signals significantly influence decision making. I suggest these studies 
have artificially separated each signal into several signals. When considering that 
organizations interact on multiple dimensions one realizes that each signal conveys a 
complex message. Each signal delivers both an informative and a legitimizing message 
from the sender to the receiver. If, for example, we take Spence’s classical example of 
job market signaling: when a job applicant informs a potential employer of his education, 
his signal has both an informative component and a legitimizing one. The subject, level 
of degree and grades provide for the employer a direct, informational signal about the 
underlying potential of the candidate. At the same time, the institution in which the 
degree was received, its reputation as a school and propensity to send graduates to the 
receivers’ arena creates an indirect, legitimizing signal about the job candidate. Thus, I 
argue that the past focus on single aspects of signals is a result of convenience rather then 
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one which enhances our understanding. Furthermore, I posit that this signal has multiple 
layers of information and therefore its interpretation is recursive. For example, the format 
in which the job applicant’s resume was constructed is a legitimizing aspect in which the 
former description is embedded. If the applicant used an academic resume style when 
applying for a position in an investment bank the hiring manager may ignore the 
application since the applicant’s signal is not conforming to the norm. The recursive 
nature of signal interpretation increases the difficulty of analyzing signal interpretation 
and challenges the researcher effort to identify correctly which ‘atom’ signal was 
responsible for the interpreter decision. 
 
Previous studies of signaling activities also tended to focus on one side of the 
sender-receiver dyad. This limitation might stem from the nature of the available research 
data. This study considers both sides in an attempt to better understand the structure of 
signals. Using the perspective that signals are multifaceted, I argue that the combination 
of the sender’s abilities to generate signals and the receiver’s abilities in interpreting 
these signals determines which aspect of the signal will be more influential in the 
decision-making process. Assuming that the signaler is aware of her signaling abilities 
and the receiver’s signal interpretation abilities, I argue that signals are target specific. 
Specifically, when the sender can generate multiple signals and the receiver’s 
interpretations skills are high, the informative aspect of the signal, i.e. the direct and 
technical facet of the signal, will be more influential. However, the legitimizing aspect of 
the signal, meaning the indirect and validating facet, will be more influential when one 
member of the dyad is not as capable as the other member. If the sender can not generate 
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multiple signals while the receiver is very proficient in deciphering signals, or if the 
sender can produce multiple signals yet the receiver is not capable of processing them, 
then the legitimizing aspect of the signal will become more prominent. Last, if both dyad 
members’ abilities in generating and interpreting signals are low, then the decision will 
be based on idiosyncratic information. This last interaction poses a limitation on 
repetitive transactions, since the receiver cannot expect to have idiosyncratic information 
about all possible senders and the sender should not expect all receivers to decide in the 
same way.  
 
The four sender-receiver signaling ability dyads create a potential explanation to 
the time segmentation of investments in nascent organizations and in particular the 
typology of the private equity investments market. The ability of a young startup to 
provide effective signals is limited by the scarcity of its accomplishments and immaturity 
of its organizational structure when compared to older startups. Additionally, there is a 
clear distinction between the investors’ types at different stages of the startup’s life. 
Research shows that, initially, nascent ventures receive funding mostly from friends and 
family, i.e. non professional investors. Furthermore, among professional private equity 
investors, venture capital firms tend to invest in ventures that are older and solicit larger 
amounts than do individual angel investors (Ibrahim, 2007; Wilmerding, 2003). Last, 
investment banks and institutional investors typically wait until the startup is close to 
becoming public or actually offer shares in an IPO. Since decision makers focus their 
attention on alternatives they believe they can control (March & Shapira, 1987, 1992) the 
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type of investor an organization can expect to solicit successfully at any given time may 
depend on the type of signal the nascent organization can emit at any point in time.  
 
The theory in this study suffers from several limitations. First, it is possible each 
signal has more then two aspects. In fact, past research has suggested signal typologies 
with three (accounting, institutional, and strategic) types of signals (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). The astute reader can probably think of additional aspects of the 
information within the signal which the receiver can find useful. Since the role of signals 
is to facilitate communications between entities, the existence of the additional aspects 
would need to be supported by providing the correlating dimension in which the 
organizations communicate. Another limitation is the lack of baseline hierarchy between 
the informative aspect and the legitimizing aspect of the signal. Initially one can expect 
the informative aspect to be of higher significance since it is closer in nature to raw 
information, the lack of which being the raison d’être of signals. However, this logic is 
not easily supported theoretically; one can argue that the reason the legitimizing aspects 
of signals are more useful when one of a dyad’s members signaling abilities are lower is 
because they are more powerful then the informative aspect of the signal.  
 
This study leaves several unanswered questions regarding the structure of signals. 
In their discussion of the environments in which organizations operate, Scott and Meyer 
(1991) propose a linear relationship between the complexity or uncertainty of the 
environments and the complexity of the internal structures. This may suggest that the 
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signal’s aspects are mutually dependent, which in turn may further explain the recursive 
nature of signal structure. A more complex structure alludes to moderating interaction 
between the aspects. Another issue that should be considered is what theory can predict 
how deep into the recursion a signal receiver will go before she finds the appropriate 
signal atom for assisting her decision making. An experiment in a controlled 
environment, or laboratory, might be the appropriate testing method of the recursive 






Figure 2.1 test 
* The legitimizing aspect is described in the left branch, the informative aspect is 
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Appendix 2 A – Signal Interpretation Recursive Routine 
 
Function: Signal_Interpretation (signal) 
{ 
aspect = Influential (informative, legitimizing); 
if Satisfied (aspect) then Return (aspect) 
else if Disenchanted (aspect) then Return (null) 







COMPETITION FOR VC ATTENTION:  







This paper studies the role of social referrals by applying the attention-based view of the 
firm to the problem of fast decision making under conditions of uncertainty. Firms use 
comprehensive decision making processes to reduce the risk embedded in such decisions. 
Yet, in dynamic settings, firms use fast decision making processes. I theorize that under 
uncertainty in dynamic environments, firms base their decisions on salient signals of 
legitimacy, such as social referrals, rather than on in-depth analysis of information. I test 
the theory using the selection stage of the Venture Capital funding process. My findings 
show that social referrals serve as strong legitimizing signals. However, I also find the 
startups whose referrals were attributed to key members of the VC team fared better than 











In this paper, I use the attention-based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997) and 
network theory (Granovetter, 1973) to study how social mediation influences Venture 
Capital (VC) firms’ opportunity selection. Similar to other opportunity selection 
processes such as network television prime time program development (Bielby and 
Bielby, 1994) and underwriter’s selection of IPOs (Higgins and Gulati, 2003), the VC 
funding process, and within it the selection stage in particular, is an example of fast 
decision making under conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty. Extant research on how 
VCs decide which startups to fund has shown that several parameters of the startup 
solicitation package influence VCs’ decision process. Studying the VCs’ decision process 
inputs and outcomes, scholars have identified the criteria used to select startups as (1) 
social ties, (2) business concept, (3) the entrepreneur’s capabilities, and (4) the general fit 
with the VC’s preferences (Hall and Hofer, 1993; Hisrich and Jankowicz, 1990; 
MacMillan et al., 1985; Shane and Cable, 2002; Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd et al., 2000). 
One criticism of these studies is their inability to identify when in the process these 
criteria influence the VC decision and why a certain criterion is more or less influential at 
a particular stage of the process. I take a first step towards understanding the relative 
importance of these criteria by studying the influence of reference networks on decision 
making under conditions of uncertainty. I argue that in order to avoid wasting attention 
resources on solicitations it will not fund, a VC’s first priority is to reduce the number of 
evaluation targets. Therefore, at the beginning of the funding process decision makers 
will prefer simple, cheap, and observable legitimizing criteria to deselect solicitations. Of 
the four previously identified criteria, social ties are the easiest criterion to observe due to 
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their dichotomous nature. In addition, when the potential value or quality of an 
opportunity is uncertain, decision makers shift their focus from the opportunity itself to 
the potential partner’s social structural position and its given legitimacy (Podolny, 1994). 
I suggest that since social mediation is both observable and legitimizing it will be used as 
a selection criterion at the initial selection stage. I find strong support for my arguments 
that social mediation is used as a selection criterion at the initial stage of the VC funding 
process. Moreover, I find that direct social interaction prior to the selection stage is more 
beneficial than indirect interaction.  
 
VC firms sift through hundreds of proposals a year while funding only a handful 
of startups (Goldfarb et al., 2005; Metrick, 2007). Typically in a VC firm a small group 
of partners makes all of the investment decisions. Hence, the attention of the venture’s 
partners is the scarce resource and its allocation is central to the success of the VC. The 
tension between the VC size limitations and the need to quickly reduce the number of 
targets results in severe constraints on the VC’s attention (Hansen and Haas, 2001). 
Hence, it is not surprising that many VC’s review submitted business plans in ten minutes 
or less (Hall and Hofer, 1993). To overcome the time constraints on decision making, 
VC’s use heuristics to test whether the soliciting startup is a legitimate candidate for 
venture funding. Therefore, identifying the appropriate signals (Spence, 1974) available 
in a startup’s solicitation packet at the initial stage of the selection process is paramount 
for understanding how a startup can capture the VC’s attention and thereby increase the 




Since organizations have limited resources, the firm’s decision makers will give 
their attention to potential business opportunities only as long as they believe that the 
potential associated with the opportunity is profitable. In rational decision making 
processes, to limit the allocation of resources to opportunities the firm will not pursue, 
decision makers will strive to eliminate most of the opportunities as soon as possible 
(Langley et al., 1995; Mintzberg et al., 1976). Since VCs’ resource limitations are 
common knowledge, and since it is already established that, in the selection stage, VCs 
screen solicitations prior to valuating the offers (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984), it is likely 
that startups will make significant efforts to stand out in the competition for VC attention. 
Therefore, I frame my theoretical arguments in terms of competition for the resource of 
attention (Ocasio, 1997). I hypothesize that under conditions of high uncertainty in the 
selection process, a startup is more likely to succeed in attracting the attention of the VC 
firm if it employs signals that convey legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), rather than 
provide more information. 
 
I test my hypotheses by using a large sample of funding solicitations from a single 
VC firm (hereafter the Focal VC) over a period of two years. I observe the soliciting 
startups’ social network and the initial reaction by the Focal VC to the funding request. 
The data include the solicitations’ characteristics as recorded by the Focal VC. Hence, the 
data represents the Focal VC’s decisions in situ and enable me to identify the cues 




In this context, social mediation occurs when an investment opportunity is 
referred to a venture capitalist by a third party with prior ties to the investor. I observe 
both direct and indirect social interaction as the result of social referrals. Direct referrals 
occur when an intermediary introduces the startup to the VC prior to the submission of an 
investment solicitation. In indirect referrals a third party submits the solicitation to the 
VC before a direct interaction takes place. Both introduction types constitute 
endorsements and confer legitimacy. My findings suggest that social mediation serves as 
a strong legitimizing signal to the decision makers. I find that endorsement is essential for 
catching the screening VC’s attention and that unendorsed requests for funding are much 
less likely to receive the venture’s attention. I interpret this to mean that, consistent with 
other entrepreneurship research (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Sorenson, 2003; Stuart, Haong 
and Hybels, 1999), social networks are a necessary condition for the acquisition of 
venture capital funding. I also find that startups whose referrals were attributed to key 
members of the VC team fared better than all other startups regardless of their referral 
source. 
 
The study proceeds as follows: First, I develop hypotheses for social mediation’s 
influence of selection. Second, I introduce the data and discuss the opportunities and 
limitations therein. Third, the testing method and results are shown, followed by a 







Theory and Background  
 
The theory of attention builds on Simon’s (1960) assertion that organizations 
provide decision makers with both the stimuli and the intermediate objectives necessary 
for taking action. Individuals and organizations cannot attend to all facets of their 
environment due to cognitive and material limitations and the environment’s ambiguity 
(Simon, 1997). To mitigate the problem, institutional logics guide the issues and 
solutions upon which organizational actors focus their attentions (Ocasio, 1997). The 
issues and solutions the firm focuses on depend on the context. The context, or the frame 
of the decision maker (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981), depends on the firm’s allocation 
of its resources to different issues according to the firm’s rules and regulations. Attention 
is defined as “the distinct focus of time and effort by the firm on a particular set of issues, 
problems, opportunities, and threats, and on a particular set of skills, routines, 
programs, projects, and procedures” (Ocasio, 1997: 188). Thus, the screening routine in 
the opportunity selection process is a point of activation of institutional logic. Those 
opportunities whose solicitation parameters align with institutional selection criteria 
become legitimate targets, and the selecting organization will spend attention resources to 
evaluate them.  
 
In the VC setting, the VC faces an abundance of funding requests with an 
uncertain future. In the VCs funding process a few managing partners make all strategic 
decisions, typically in a committee fashion. Thus, the VC firm allocates specialized 
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resources to select the startup it will fund in the form of the VC partners’ time and effort. 
Given the one-to-many relationship between the VC and the soliciting startups, the 
startup needs to win the competitive battle for the VC’s attention and other resources vis-
à-vis other potential investment targets in the same pool of solicitations. The VC’s size 
and decision making routine structure of “decision by committee” limits the attention 
resources (i.e. time and effort) the VC’s partners can spend on each incoming 
solicitations (Hall and Hofer, 1993), thereby forcing the decision makers to significantly 
reduce the number of solicitations admitted into the process. In short, the startups 
compete for the VC’s attention while the VC wishes to limit the attention spent on 
solicitations, which, for the most part, it will not fund. 
 
To limit the amount of attention, or the amount of selective cognitive work 
invested in a task (Kahneman, 1973), the firm can base its decision making on heuristics 
rather than in depth analysis of the available information (March and Shapira, 1987, 
1992; Miller and Shapira, 2004). The cue’s salience, i.e. the extent to which an attention 
grabbing stimulus stands out relative to others in their environment (Fiske and Taylor, 
1991), determines the signal’s effectiveness in influencing a decision. Cues that are 
novel, unexpected, goal relevant, negative, and repetitive are more salient. Salient signals 
stand out as selection criterions to the decision maker, grasp her attention, and therefore 
increase the speed at which a decision is made. Thus, salient cues reduce the amount 




Extant research of VC solicitation evaluation focused on the criteria by which 
venture capitalists select ventures for funding. These studies have identified such criteria 
combinations as follows: fit with the VC’s investment guidelines and industry 
characteristics (Hall and Hofer, 1993); management uniqueness and return (Hisrich and 
Jankowicz, 1990); the perceived quality of the entrepreneurs experience and exit 
opportunities (MacMillan et al., 1985); social ties (Shane and Cable, 2002); and 
probability of survival, lead time, and competitive environment (Shepherd, 1999). Put 
together, I identify four general selection criteria: (a) the deal origin, (b) the business 
concept, (c) the entrepreneurs’ capabilities, and, (d) the solicitation’s fit with the VC’s 
preferences.  
 
While scholars have observed the results of the VC funding decision process and 
the criteria leading to these results, we still know little about the process itself. Examples 
of previous research of opportunity selection processes in other areas reveal a similar 
trend: TV prime time pilot selection legitimacy (Bielby and Bielby, 1994), the impact of 
security coverage by analysts on stock performance (Zuckerman, 1999), the influence of 
managerial experience on securing prestigious underwriter backing (Higgins and Gulati, 
2003), and the effect of organizational structure on technology partnership development 
(Qing and Gupta, 2007). On one hand, the empirical entrepreneurship studies mentioned 
above suggest that the VC opportunity selection is a rational decision making routine 
similar to selection processes in other industries. On the other hand, venture capitalists 
reject efforts to systemize their decision process (Podolny, 2001; Hallen, 2007; Kirsch et 
al., 2009). As a result, attempts to map the VC decision making process are rare, and we 
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have only a vague notion of where within the funding process VCs use the 
aforementioned four criteria. Based on retrospective reporting, Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) 
modeled the VC funding process as a five stage process: (1) Deal Origination, (2) Deal 
Screening, (3) Deal Evaluation, (4) Deal Structuring, and, (5) Post-Investment Activities. 
According to this model, all of the VC’s screening activities take place between 
generation and evaluation of the deal. It would seem that every solicitation that passes the 
screening stage is evaluated in an attempt to structure a funding deal. However, when 
considering the criteria found to influence the selection of funding targets this separation 
is not as clear. For example, as a parameter, social ties represent a screening effort prior 
to the screening stage. Additionally, such criteria as proposal uniqueness and industry 
competitiveness seem to fit better with screening during the deal evaluation stage rather 
than earlier as the model suggests. In an effort to understand the “quick and dirty” stage 
of opportunity selection I focus my attention on finding which criteria influence the 
initial screening within the VC funding decision process. 
 
Studies of the speed of decision processes have yielded interesting, if sometimes 
inconsistent, results (Baum, and Wally, 2003; Hough and White, 2003). Judge and Miller 
(1991) have shown a positive relation between decision makers’ speed in dynamic 
environments and performance, and a negative relationship in stable environments. The 
relationship between the decision process comprehensiveness: “the extent to which 
organizations attempt to be exhaustive or inclusive in making and integrating strategic 
decisions” (Fredrickson, and Mitchell, 1984) and performance was also found to have a 
contradicting effect on performance depending on the environment. In unstable 
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environments decision process comprehensiveness was found to lower performance 
(Fredrickson, and Mitchell, 1984) while at stable environments comprehensiveness was 
found to generate increased performance (Fredrickson, 1984). Eisenhardt found that both 
speed and comprehensiveness increase firm performance in dynamic environments 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). To summarize, decision making 
speed influence on performance is environment dependent. Studies suggest that 
emphasizing speed in dynamic environments behooves the firm while comprehensive 
processes suite more stable situations. 
 
The key resource VCs invest in selecting funding targets is time. In particular, 
time of the VC’s partners in which they focus their efforts and talents on the solicitation. 
VCs value time as a critical component for reducing the risk of investments (Shepherd, 
1999). Since VCs operate in unstable environments (Shepherd, 1999) and fund startups 
operating at the fringe of existing markets or in yet to be established markets, venture 
screening is a typical case of decision making in a dynamic environment. To overcome 
the problem of limited attention resources, VCs make an effort to minimize the time they 
give each solicitation before dismissing it as an unattractive investment target. In fact, 
VCs often invest only a few minutes for reviewing each solicitation before making a 
decision whether to discard it or continue its evaluation (Hall and Hofer, 1993). 
Therefore, in the initial stage of screening, when the ambiguity regarding the solicitations 
is high, VCs will prefer criteria that allow for fast decision making. The need to limit the 
attention given to unfunded solicitations crystallizes when considering the order of 
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magnitude difference between the hundreds of solicitations the VC receives each year 
versus the handful of startups it funds in a year (Goldfarb et al., 2005; Metrick, 2007). 
 
While the VC rejects solicitations throughout the funding process, the need to 
avoid spending valuable attention resources on startups it will not fund drives VCs to 
deselect as many solicitations as possible as early as possible with the lowest possible 
investment of attention resources. Thus, VC will screen first based on simple, observable, 
and broad criteria. 
  
Typically, opportunities originate through one of three sources (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984). First, members of the firm participate in professional forums, business plan 
competitions, etc. and invite presenters whose potential and fit seem appealing to submit 
a funding request with the VC. Second, the firm’s referral network recommends an 
opportunity by either introducing the startup to the VC or submitting a solicitation on 
behalf of the startup. Last, unsolicited funding requests arrive to the firm. The three 
solicitation sources fall into two categories: referred and cold-call. Referred solicitations 
originate through premeditated channels of the organization. Cold-call solicitations arrive 
without the involvement of either firm members or their social network. The 
dichotomous distinction between the two source categories creates an easy to determine 
and broad screening tool, fulfilling the need of the VC at this selection stage.  
 
Previous studies show VCs prefer to fund referred solicitations rather than cold-
call solicitations. Apparently, VC’s expect cold-call solicitations to be of lower quality 
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(Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). Network theory supports the VCs point of view. Network 
analysis studies the pattern and content of interaction that takes place between social 
units. Network scholars use the term “tie type” to identify the relationship between 
network members (Granovetter, 1973). The distinction between strong and weak ties 
types is useful for analyzing the social ties’ role as suppliers of information. A tie’s 
strength is a function of three factors: (1) frequency of contact, (2) reciprocity, and, (3) 
friendship. Thus, strong ties are frequent contacts between actors that may create mutual 
benefits and are generally conducted in a friendly, positive manner. Weak ties are 
infrequent, or new contacts. The importance of weak ties comes from their ability to 
provide the actor with information that is novel to the network (Granovetter, 1973). 
Decoupled from the bridging effect, stronger ties are more beneficial to decision makers 
than weak ties since repetition generates a greater volume of information between ties 
(Burt, 1992). In a study of strategic alliances Gulati (1995b) has shown that firms prefer 
to generate new alliances with partners of previous alliances, if such a partner is ill 
equipped for the demands of the new cooperation the firm will prefer to interact with a 
partner of the partner rather than search for a partner without a recommendation. In 
addition, referred solicitations have in them an embedded screening mechanism. 
Managers define and react to risk based on their focus of attention, and mangers focus 
their attention on alternatives they believe they can control (March and Shapira, 1987, 
1992). Thus, inviting solicitations based on active search by VC members in 
entrepreneurial forums or receiving a solicitation through an established contact is an 
attempt by the VC to reduce the uncertainty within the solicitation and control the level 
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of risk. Thus, a solicitation arriving through a social referral is perceived to be legitimate 
and therefore will have more success than cold-call solicitations. Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Social mediation will positively influence the likelihood of 
a solicitation successfully passing the initial screening, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
Under conditions of uncertainty, decision makers focus their attention on the 
social standing of a partner (Podolny, 1994). The social standing, or status, of a social tie 
is derived from past experiences with the actor, i.e. the stronger the tie the higher its 
status. For example, repeated cooperative interaction between firms shape the reputation 
of the partners and foster trust in each other’s abilities (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; 
Gulati, 1995a). The status of firm’s network ties has a positive influence on its financial 
performance (Carter and Manaster 1990; Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Hallen, 2007). 
Securing the backing of a higher status organization is especially important for young 
organizations since they lack legitimacy in their environment (Rao, 1994). In an 
asymmetric information decision process, the increased volume and perceived quality of 
information received from strong ties help decision makers to reduce uncertainty 
(Podolny, 2001).  
 
Thus, network theory defines stronger ties as having higher status and predicts 
that under uncertainty the status of a tie legitimizes the information it passes. However, 
using past terms associated with strong ties to decide which referred solicitation will be 
perceived as more legitimate is difficult. A referred solicitation can arrive in one of three 
ways: (1) through an active participation of the VC in an entrepreneurial forum or 
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competition, (2) an existing social tie can introduce a startup to a VC partner thereby 
creating a new direct tie, and, (3) an existing tie can mediate between the startup and the 
VC, hence, the solicitation is submitted indirectly. Solicitations where the VC has 
interacted with the startup prior to the actual submission are direct in nature and mediated 
referrals are indirect in nature. These venues differ on two aspects of tie’s strength: 
repetition and distance. Mediating ties have a preexisting history with the VC and 
therefore have a higher repetition value than direct ties. On the other hand, the proximity 
of direct ties allows the VC to glean more information about the solicitation. In effect, the 
presoliciting interaction offers the decision maker the opportunity to screen the startup 
prior to the official solicitation. While distance is the most commonly used term in 
operationalizing the concept of strong and weak ties, it is usually based on personal 
familiarity rather than directness (Granovetter, 1973; Uzzi, 1996; Greve and Salaff, 
2003). In the context of legitimacy of information, repetition and history are frequently 
used as means for operationalizing the strength of social ties (Burt, 1992; Krackhardt, 
1992; Podolny, 1994, 2001). Only a single study (Greve, 1995) used direct ties as strong 
and indirect ties as weak. Since managers prefer to focus their attention on alternatives 
they can control (March and Shapira, 1987, 1992) I argue decision makers prefer to 
prescreen opportunities themselves rather the counting on a mediator.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Given social mediation, direct interaction will have a 
stronger positive influence on the likelihood of a solicitation successfully 
passing the initial screening than indirect mediation, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
VC partners are busy people. According to the VC funding process model, 
beyond selecting promising solicitations VC partners engage in originating, evaluating, 
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and structuring deals (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1994). Additionally, partners devote a 
significant portion of their time to post investment activities such as guidance, 
management recruiting, finding future investors, and managing the VC’s exit strategy 
(Lerner 1994, 1995). VCs spend between seven and thirty-five (35) hours per month per 
investment pending on the importance VCs put on their post investment activities 
(Elango et al., 1995). The additional workload stemming from the number of solicitations 
that already passed the screening stage reduces the amount of attention resources 
available for selecting new incoming solicitations (Shepherd et al., 2005).  
 
VCs do not have exclusivity on incoming solicitations. The same solicitation that 
arrived at the Focal VC could have been sent to a competitor at the same time. Thus, if 
the Focal VC decides to keep processing new solicitations, it cannot postpone screening 
to a later time when its workload is lower. Therefore, when processing new solicitations, 
VCs use a First-In First-Out (FIFO) queue for screening the arriving solicitations. Theory 
suggests that to maximize their profitability VCs balance the allocation of attention on 
pre and post investment activities (Shepherd et al., 2005). Selection is only one of the 
pre-investment stages in the VC funding process. Thus, the higher the number of 
solicitations in the pre-investment stages, the lower the need for adding new solicitations 
to the funding process and the lower the amount of available attention resources for 
selection. While VCs appear to be risk inclined when considering product technology, 
they are actually risk averse when evaluating investment solicitations (Gompers, 1995, 
1996; Shepherd, 1999). Hence, as the level of available attention resources declines, the 
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VC will look for more reasons to reject arriving solicitations and will base its rejection 
decisions on the most salient cues. Formally, I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The workload of preexisting solicitations that passed initial 
screening will decrease the likelihood of current solicitations successfully 
passing initial screening, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The workload of preexisting solicitations that passed 
initial screening will strengthen the effect of social mediation on passing 




I study competition for attention by looking at how VCs select investment 
opportunities for further evaluation. I use a large sample of solicitations submitted to a 
single American venture capitalist based in the Northeast (the Focal VC). The Focal VC 
operated between April 1999 and February 2002 and partnered with a major internet 
portal. Over 89% of the solicitations proposed to create Dot Com firms. Thus, the 
solicitations in the complete sample were submitted during the peak of the Dot Com 
bubble and its immediate aftermath. However, the focal VC started coding the 
solicitations’ network references sporadically in early October 2000 and consistently 
from November 11th, 2000, thus, the sample pertinent to this study should not suffer from 
the ‘gold rush’ effect of the bubble. Rather, the test sample represents the behavior of 
VCs during a depressed market. Discussions with the Focal VC’s partners suggest that 
the Focal VC’s funding process resembles a sophisticated version of the model suggested 
by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984). Hence, I consider popular concerns regarding the 
investment selection and evaluation methods of Dot Com investment opportunities during 




The complete sample consists of 2,669 solicitations seeking venture capital 
funding. Unfortunately, the focal venture capital firm did not save all of the information 
for all of the submissions. I dropped seventeen solicitations that had no decision 
indication or erroneous date information. Out of the 2,652 solicitations, only 1,016 
solicitations have referral information; of those 1,003 were received after November 11, 
2000, which is when the VC started saving reference information. These 1,003 
solicitations are the base for this study. Of these solicitations, 514 were referred 
solicitations and 489 were unsolicited solicitations. Out of the 514 referred solicitations, 
211 had indirect referral. These include 7 solicitations whose source was unidentified, 
152 who were referred by professional contacts such as investment bankers, lawyers, and 
accountants, and 52 who resulted from connections with regional representatives 
‘appointed’ by the Focal VC. There are 303 solicitations with a direct referral. Of those, 
77 are attributed to entrepreneurial conferences and 226 are solicitations whose 
submission is attributed directly to the partners.  
 
During the period from October 2000 to February 2002 the Focal VC actually 
received 1,181 solicitations. The 165 solicitations were without referral specification and 
the 13 solicitations with referral data arriving prior to November 11, 2000 were 
instrumental in calculating workload variables but otherwise did not participate in the 
regression analysis. Each week, the VC received between 4 and 42 solicitations (average 
19.10) and admitted as many as 13 into its evaluation stage (see Figure 3.1). Only 32% of 
the total solicitation sample (847 out of 2,652) successfully passed the selection stage to 
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receive further attention from the Focal VC. The study’s sample of 1,003 has a slightly 
better success ratio of ~36%. Ideally, I would compare the attributes of the studied 
soliciting population to those of a representative sample of the general population along 
the observable dimensions. Unfortunately, I know of no representative sample of firms 
seeking venture capital funding. 
 
              ========================================== 
Insert Figure 3.1 about here 
              ========================================== 
 
 
My data timeframe follows the Dot Com era, defined as the period between the 
Netscape IPO and the peak of the NASDAQ in March 2000. This poses two important 
problems. First, even after the bubble burst, this is an era of early industry emergence. 
There was no tried and true “way of doing business” on the internet during this period 
(See Goldfarb et al., forthcoming). Second, the sample is internet specific. It is not 
known to what extent my results generalize to selection processes of mature industries or 
in other emerging industries, nanotechnology for example. This problem is mitigated as 
my sample only includes solicitations received during the post-bust era when the industry 
was somewhat more mature and. more importantly, less appealing to investors. Hence 
one can expect investors to be more cautious. Third, I established through interviews that 
the funding process utilized by the focal VC closely resembles the model suggested in 
literature (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984). While it is fashionable to criticize funding in the 
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Dot Com bubble era for investing in internet startups without executing any process of 
due diligence, I do not have any reason to suspect the Focal VC strayed from their 
process before, during or after the Dot Com era, or that their method of selection varied 
over time. Moreover, the process used by the Focal VC had additional safeguards on top 
of the model suggested in the literature. Therefore, since the model suggested by Tyebjee 
and Bruno is not industry specific, I believe my sample is generalizable to other venture 
capital firms’ investment selection processes and informative to selection processes in 
other dynamic environments as well. 
 
Dependent Variable  
Selection. I use a binary variable to capture the result of the screening process, 
where 1 indicates the startup was selected for further evaluation and 0 means the Focal 
VC has decided to pass on the opportunity and will give no further attention to the 
soliciting startup. Each week the Focal VC assigned new solicitations to “champions”. 
Every Monday a selection meeting was conducted in which the “champions” presented 
the solicitations that arrived during the prior week. After a roundtable discussion, a 
decision was made, either to begin evaluating the solicitation or to dismiss it from the 
Focal VC’s pipeline. Out of the 1,003 solicitations, only 359 passed the screening stage. 
Between November 2000 and February 2002 an average of 6.65 (Std. 3.06) solicitations 




Independent Variables  
Referral: The Focal VC tracked the source of the requests for funding after 
November 11th, 2000. (This date is associated with a refinement of internal processes of 
the Focal VC). 1,003 requests for funding that arrived after this date were socially 
mediated – in the sense that they were either requested by the venture capitalist, socially 
mediated by an acquaintance of the venture capitalist, or encountered in an investment 
forum. This action in itself indicates the importance of social networks to the VC firm 
decision making. I created a binary variable (d_all _ref), which takes the value of 1 when 
the solicitation had a referral and 0 when the solicitation arrived over the transom. I also 
created a set of binary dummy variables for each referral type and an ordinal variable that 
ranked the solicitations by the type of referral. Since the results do not differ significantly 
between the ordinal variable and the binary set, I use the binary variables, which do not 
assume linearity.  
 
From my interviews with the VC partners I learned the VC had four types of 
referral sources: (a) regional representatives (b) professional contacts (c) 
entrepreneurship forums and competition, and (d) members of the Focal VC firm. The 
VC had made specific efforts to establish referral venues by designating entrepreneurs 
with which they had previous relationships. These were identified by the Focal VC as 
regional representatives. The dummy variable d_rep_ref has a value of 1 when the 
solicitation arrived through a regional representative and 0 if the referral came through 
any other type or there was no referral. The second type of referral represents 
solicitations that arrived from professional acquaintances of members of the VC, such as 
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investment bankers, lawyers, accountants and other professionals. The dummy variable 
d_pro_ref takes the value of 1 when a solicitation arrived through this venue and 0 in any 
other event. The dummy variable d_forum_ref represents solicitations that arrived after a 
member of the Focal VC participated in an entrepreneurship forum (or competition) and 
encouraged a participating startup to submit a solicitation. In such an event, the dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 otherwise it is zero. The dummy variable d_personal_ref 
takes the value of 1 when the solicitation referral was attributed directly to a member of 
the Focal VC otherwise it is zero. Only seven referred solicitations do not have a specific 
source, for these solicitations I created the dummy variable d_other_ref (see Table 3.1 for 
more details).  
 
I created two additional dummy variables as proxies for referral directness. Based 
on the role of the Focal VC in creating the solicitation, the previously described five 
referring types can be categorized as either an external or internal reference type. An 
internal referral is one where a member of the VC was in direct contact with the soliciting 
startup prior to the solicitation, thus the Focal VC member had an active role in 
generating that particular referred solicitation. A solicitation with an external referral has 
arrived from a referent external to the Focal VC. Hence, referrals correlated with the 
personal and forum dummy types represent internally referred solicitations and are 
grouped into the dummy variable d_int_ref. Solicitations who were referred by regional 
representatives, professionals, and other referrals are designated as external referrals and 
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grouped into d_ext_ref. VC members are directly responsible for 303 of the 520 referred 
solicitations, while the other 211 referral arrived through external sources. 3  
 
= = = = = = = = = = 
Insert Table 3.1 about here 
= = = = = = = = = 
 
Workload. Through interviews of the Focal VC’s partners, I learned that on 
average it took the Focal VC six weeks to evaluate a solicitations and twelve weeks to 
finalize a deal. Thus, the workload variable is the sum of the solicitations in the 
evaluation stage plus the current number of solicitations waiting for selection. 
Solicitations at the evaluation stage are those that successfully passed the selection stage 
in the six weeks preceding the solicitation’s recorded arrival date.4 During its busiest 
period, the workload consisted of 90 solicitations (in both the evaluation and screening 
stages). On average the six-week workload was 57.17 solicitations (Std. 15.43).  
 
Workload interactions. I created workload interaction variables to test for the 
effect of previously selected solicitations and their burden on the VC’s attention 
                                                 
3 The social network of founders associated with referred solicitations, by definition, included venture 
capitalists. Strictly speaking, I can only conclude that the social networks of entrepreneurs associated with 
unsolicited requests did not include the Focal VC. However, it is possible that these social networks did not 
include venture capitalists in general. Alternatively, submission of an unsolicited request for funding may 
be indicative of the general naiveté of the entrepreneur. 
4 While a twelve-week load variable is also feasible, I argue that such a measurement will result in a poor 
representation of reality. Most of the solicitations in the evaluation stage are weeded out before the end of 
the evaluation stage and do not continue to deal negotiations. Hence, using a twelve-week load will result 
in a skewed measurement. Additionally, I tested a one-week and four-week load variables, but, since the 
yielded outcomes were similar to the six-week variable, I did not include them in the analysis. 
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resources availability. I calculated an interaction term for each of the previous 
independent variables.  
= = = = = = = = = = 
Insert Table 3.2 about here 
= = = = = = = = = = 
 
Control Variables 
Meeting load. I interviewed a partner of the Focal VC and learned that selection 
decisions were made during a weekly selection meeting. Every Monday the Focal VC 
members met to screen the solicitations that arrived in the previous week. Thus, to 
control for meeting time constraints I measured weekly density as the number of 
solicitations processed in the weekly selection meeting. Between 4 and 42 solicitations 
arrived each week, the average number of solicitations per week being 19.10 (Std. 7.95). 
Since only one week had more then 30 solicitations I used the logged meeting load5.  
 
Investment round. The VC collected investment round indicators for 976 of the 
solicitations. I used VentureXpert data to verify the existence of prior venture funding 
rounds. The round code (A, B, C, etc.) was translated to a responding ordinal numeric 
values with Seed=0, A=1, B=2 and 3 for all other rounds. On average the soliciting 
startups had 2.09 earlier rounds of investment (Std. 0.78). 
 
                                                 
5 In unreported tests I used a sample in which I dropped the week with 42 incoming solicitations 
(incidentally, the week in question is the first week of the current data). The results did not differ in any 
significant way. Hence I kept the sample intact. 
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I created several additional variables to assist in controlling for the difference in 
investment mindset and the effect of external events. The following variables were 
created for each solicitation by using its submission date as a place finder.  
 
VC transactions. I captured the monthly number of VC rounds recorded and the 
number of startups funded each month as recorded at VentureXpert. On average 717.19 
startups were funded each month during the period.  
 
VC investments. Additionally, I captured the monthly sum of VC investments (in 
billions) as recorded at VentureXpert and the quarterly sum of VC investments (in 
billions) as recorded on PriceWaterhouseCoopers MoneyTree. On average VCs invested 
6.48 billion dollars every month and 12.32B$ per quarter. These indexes result in 
significantly different average investment sums per VC round – 9.03M$ according to 
VentureXpert and 5.72M$ according to PWC.  
 
Stock exchange. I created three variables of the NASDAQ stock exchange to 
further help controlling the effect of time, industry, and external factors. First I captured 
the weekly closing position of the NASDAQ; second I captured the maximum position of 
the NASDAQ at each week, and last, I estimated the weekly trend by calculating the 






= = = = = = = = = = 
Insert Table 3.3 about here 
= = = = = = = = = 
 
Analysis and Results 
 
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics and table 3.3 reports the correlations of 
all the hypothesized as well as control variables. There is a strong positive correlation 
between the dependent variable (DV) d_select to all of the reference variables, including 
interactions, and to the control variable invst_round; there is also weaker negative 
correlation between the DV and the NASDAQ control variable. However, the workload 
measurements (workload, log_meeting) are not correlated with the DV. The strong 
positive correlation between the DV and the referral indicators suggests H1 will be 
supported. Additionally, the noticeable strength difference between the internal and 
external referral indicators (r=0.360 and 0.196 respectively) suggests H2 will also be 
supported. Moreover, it is clear that the use of the VC members’ personal network is 
preferred over any other referral type as d_personal_ref is about 2.5 times bigger than the 
next indicator.  
 
As one would expect, there is also strong negative correlation within the referral 
variables. Only one referral indicator—other_ref—is not significant, probably due to the 
small number (7) of observations. Interestingly there is a significant positive correlation 
between workload and the referral indicators, which is in the opposite directions 
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suggested by hypotheses 3a. The invst_round control variable, which indicates the 
number of previous investments, has a strong and positive correlation with the DV as 
well as with various referral indicators. This correlation is strongest with the professional 
and personal referral indicators (r=0.148 and 0.180 respectively). Only workload is 
strongly correlated to the rest of the control variables.  
 
= = = = = = = = = = 
Insert Table 3.4 about here 
= = = = = = = = = 
 
Table 3.4 reports the results from the logistic regressions. Model 1 is the 
regression run on the control variables only. This model shows the Focal VC preferred 
solicitations from startups who have secured investments in their past (βinvst_round=0.707, 
p<.01). Model 2 shows that submitting a solicitation through a referral has a positive and 
significant effect on being selected for further evaluation (β=2.327, p<.01), supporting 
H1. The marginal effect of having a referral is very strong, a solicitation with a social 
referral is 45% more likely to pass the screening stage than a solicitation without a 
referral (β=0.454, p<.01). This finding supports the notion that social referrals are the key 
signal the VC partners look for when screening solicitations. 
 
Model 3 tests if referrals arriving from external sources are more effective than 
internally generated referrals. The external referral variable d_ext_ref includes referrals 
arriving from professional network nodes (investment bankers, lawyers, etc.), regional 
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representatives and other referrals. The internal variable d_int_ref consists of referrals 
where the VC members had direct interaction with the startup prior to the solicitation 
submission. Both external referrals and internal referrals are positive and significant with 
internally generated solicitations slightly stronger in both power and significance 
(βext=2.147, p<.01; βint=2.471, p<.01). The results suggest that internally generated 
solicitations are at least as effective as external referrals. A Wald test shows the 
coefficients are statistically marginally different (χ2=2.84, p<.09), therefore solicitations 
arriving due to internal referrals are more likely to pass the screening stage for further 
evaluation than indirectly referred solicitations, but the results of this test are not 
sufficient to fully support H2. Model 4 compares the five individual referral types6. All 
referral types are significant and have strong marginal effect, with personal referral 
indicator being the strongest. A Wald test confirms the coefficients are significantly 
different from each other (χ2=12.98, p<.005). This suggests that solicitations whose 
referral was attributed to internal members of the Focal VC fared better in the screening 
stage than other solicitations, with or without referral. To further test this notion I created 
an additional indicator (d_notpers_ref) representing all referrals that are not directly 
attributed to members of the VC firm. Model 5 tests this relationship, both personal and 
all other referrals are significant and strong (βpersonal=2.653, p<.01; βnotpers=2.093, p<.01) 
and a Wald test confirms the indicators are different (χ2=8.58, p<.003). The marginal 
effects test shows that having a referral from an entity external to the VC will improve 
the likelihood of passing the screening stage by about 46% while creating relationship 
with a member of the VC prior to submitting a solicitation will increase it by almost 58%. 
                                                 
6 The variable d_other_ref was automatically dropped in all models as it perfectly predicts failure. 
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These results support the suggestion that personal referrals are a stronger signal than 
other referral types in the Focal VC screening process7. Thus, H2 is supported. 
 
I test the influence of the VC workload on the Focal VC screening stage in Table 
3.5. Model 6 tests the effect of combined workload, i.e. the number of solicitations 
previously selected for further attention and current density of solicitations screened in 
the weekly meeting, on being successfully selected. The results show workload does not 
influence selection significantly. In an unreported regression I tested a model where 
solicitations that previously passed the screening stage were separated from the 
solicitation discussed in the meeting, however that model yielded similar results. As 
model 6 shows the current (weekly) density of solicitations does not have a significant 
influence on the chances of a solicitation passing the screening stage. Therefore, H3 is 
rejected.  
 
= = = = = = = = = = 
Insert Table 3.5 about here 
= = = = = = = = = 
 
Hypothesis 3a suggests that the VC’s workload will increase importance of salient 
cues, such as solicitation referrals, on the chance of being selected for further attention. I 
test H3a in models 7 through 10. The interaction effects of the VC’s workload on having 
                                                 
7 Some Wald tests in unreported regressions suggested that actually the regional representative indicator 
(d_rep_ref) is undistinguishable from the VC personal indicator (d_personal_ref). I tested this possibility 
by creating alternative internal and external reference indicators where d_int_ref was the combination of 
d_personal_ref and d_rep_ref rather than using d_forum_ref as described in the data section. Nevertheless, 
the results are similar. It appears that the instigator is the personal referral type d_personal_ref. 
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a referral oppose my suggested theory. In model 7 both main effects are positive and 
significant (βref=3.773, p<.01; βwload=0.035, p<.10), however, the interaction effect is 
negative and significant (βref=-0.025, p<.05). In model 8 I tested the interaction effect of 
workload on external versus internal references. Similarly to model 3, both internal and 
external referrals main effects are positive and significant (βext=3.954, p<.01; βint=3.603, 
p<.01), additionally, the workload main effect is significant but small (βwload=0.037, 
p<.05). While the interaction effects for both internal and external referrals are negative, 
only the interaction effect on external referrals is significant (βext*wload=-0.032, p<.05). 
Interestingly, the power of workload is so small that the interaction effect on external 
referrals negative effect almost cancels it. Model 9 tests each of the referral indicators 
individually. The results show that the main effect for all indicators are positive and that 
while all interactions are negative in direction, only the interactions of indirect referrals 
are significant (βpro*wload=-0.030, p<.05; βrep*wload=-0.054, p<.05). Similar to model 5, 
model 10 compares personal referrals with all other types while adding the interaction 
effect of preexisting workload, the results are essentially the same as models 8 and 9, 
Therefore, H3a is rejected.  
 
To understand better the role of different referral type as signals, I used a subset 
of the data which includes only solicitations with referrals (n=496). The marginal effects 
for the regressions of this subset are presented in Table 3.6. The odd model numbers test 
each referral indicator alone; in the even models the interaction with workload is added. 
Models 11 and 12 compare internal and external referrals. This segmentation of reference 
types has only marginal significance (β=0.082, p<.10). When adding the interaction 
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effect the model is no longer significant, suggesting the separation into internal and 
external is crude (see footnote 5 for more details). Models 13 and 14 compare the 
regional representative referral type—d_rep_ref0—with all other referral types. While 
the effect of this referral type is positive, it is not significantly different from other 
referral types. Models 15 and 16 compare indirect solicitations arriving from professional 
sources, and models 17-18 do the same for solicitations that resulted from VC members 
participating in an entrepreneurship forum. Both referral types have a significant negative 
marginal effect when compared with all other referrals (βpro =-0.145, p<.01; βforum=-
0.116, p<.10), suggesting that solicitations with these referral types fare worse than other 
referral solicitations in the screening stage. Models 19 and 20 compare solicitations 
arriving through the VC members’ personal network, the results show that these 
solicitations fare better than any other referred solicitation (βpersonal =0.134, p<.01). 
Hence, startups whose interaction with members of the VC prior to submitting a 
solicitation is such that the solicitation referral is attributed to members of the VC 
directly, and are 13% more likely to pass the screening stage and receive further attention 
from the VC. It should be noted that none of the interaction effect models showed any 
significance. These additional tests strengthen the previous analysis conclusion that the 
Focal VC is more likely to pass solicitations into the evaluation stage if the solicitation 
arrival was attributed to one of the VC members.  
 
= = = = = = = = = = 
Insert Table 3.6 about here 





In this study, I focus on fast decision making under uncertainty in dynamic 
environments and study why startups vary in their receipt of attention from institutional 
venture funders. VC firms are a central funding source for young organizations and 
therefore are often faced with a large number of potential investment opportunities at any 
given time. Recognizing the limitations on a VC’s attention resources in selecting 
investment opportunities for evaluation, I assert that startups need to send legitimizing 
signals to the VC if they are to successfully pass the screening stage. Legitimizing signals 
are signals that confer the status or reputation of a third party to the signaler, in this 
setting, the soliciting startups benefits from the reputation of the social referent. Prior 
research has already demonstrated the significant role of social networks in increasing the 
chances of success (Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Shane and Cable, 2002). I corroborate the 
theory that the use of social referrals for submitting solicitations is a signal conveying 
legitimacy and demonstrate that this is especially important at the initial screening stage 
of the VC funding process.  
 
This study evaluates an important class of signals. I found that social mediation is 
strongly associated with catching the attention of decision makers. Additionally the 
results show that solicitations whose referral is attributed internally are more likely to 
receive the VC’s attention. Previous research has found that the startups who were most 
successful in raising venture capital had cultivated a relationship with the members of the 
VC firm prior to soliciting funding (Hallen, 2007). My results suggest that the established 
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relationship is critical in successfully passing the screening stage. Future research can test 
the effect of direct social interaction prior to solicitation on the interpretation and 
evaluation of information in later stages of the VC funding process. In the interim, 
entrepreneurs seeking venture capital funding should cultivate social contacts with 
venture capitalists prior to funding solicitation. 
 
Several findings in my study add to extant literature. A recent study of investment 
selection found that internal investment decisions made by the founders of firms were 
based on perceptions while consequent investment decisions made by external investors 
were based on objective information (Eckhardt, Shane and Delmar, 2006). My findings 
suggest that this separation is contextual and that the initial selection conducted by 
external investors may be similarly based on perception of legitimacy rather than 
information. Second, I find that startups that interacted directly with members of the VC 
firm prior to submitting a solicitation were more likely to pass the selection stage than 
were startups who submitted their solicitations indirectly. Theory suggests that network 
prestige has a positive effect on young firms’ success (Higgins and Gulati, 2003; Hallen, 
2007) since the status of the startup’s network help to legitimize the startup. Additionally, 
status has been found to be correlated with expectations of quality (Podolny, 1993). 
Hence, according to network theory solicitations with prestigious referrals should fare 
batter in the screening stage than other solicitations, with or without referrals, since the 
VC views these startups to be of higher quality and therefore deserving of further 
attention8. While I find a positive influence of prestigious referrals on success, my results 
                                                 
8 A test of the content and quality of the documentation in the dataset’s solicitations failed to find 
significant differences between solicitations arriving with or without social referrals (Kirsch et al., 2006) 
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show that having a direct connection to the decision makers is more important than 
prestige as measured by external referral. This is potentially an important finding for 
entrepreneurs, startups, and other organizations with lower levels of social capital. First, 
under conditions of uncertainty, to receive the support of prestigious players the 
entrepreneur needs to have similar status (Podolny, 1994), a tall order for most young 
firms due to the liability of newness. From a tactical perspective, this finding implies that 
when seeking access to a potential venture backer, an entrepreneur will be better served 
asking for an introduction rather than an indirect referral of a business plan. This 
conclusion is strengthened when considering the effect of any other workload on the 
demand for attention..  
 
Comparing the influence of direct and indirect ties on decision making can 
contribute to the literature of brokerage. Brokerage is a process in which intermediary an 
entity facilitates the movement of information or resources between other entities in need 
of access (Marsden, 1982). Gould and Fernandez (1989) partition brokerage behavior in 
social systems into five mutually exclusive subgroups. Two of these subgroups: liaison 
and gatekeeper are relevant for the discussion of this study’s results. A liaison is a broker 
between two separate entities who acts in between them, i.e. each of the three actors is 
independent of the other two. In this study both the ‘representative’ and ‘professional’ 
referrers conform to the liaison typecast. A gatekeeper is defined as an actor who 
selectively grants outsiders access to members or resources of his group. Both ‘personal’ 
and ‘forum’ referral types in this study belong to this type of broker. A study of 
government organizations acting as brokers showed that liaison type brokers are 
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influential only if the broker stays impartial, on the other hand, gatekeeper brokers were 
more effective when they took a stand (Fernandez and Gould, 2003). The results of this 
study show that gatekeeper brokers are more influential than liaison brokers are when the 
outsiders are competing for the attention of the gatekeeper’s organization. Moreover, this 
is true for both types of gatekeeper referrals.  
 
In general, the results of my test for the influence of increased demand for 
attention resources have yielded more questions than answers. Theory suggests that given 
the need to balance the funding process, with an increased workload in its evaluation 
process the VC will reduce the number of solicitations that pass the screening. 
Additionally, due to the higher volume at the evaluation stage the increased demand for 
VC attention, resources will increase the need of the decision maker to rely on effective 
heuristics, such as referrals. However, my results showed the opposite effect. While the 
main effect of referrals was positive, so was the effect of workload, i.e. the higher the 
workload the more likely a solicitation was to pass the screening stage. Moreover, the 
interaction between referrals and workload was negative, thus weakening the influence of 
referrals on the chance to pass the screening stage successfully. Additionally, I find that 
externally-mediated solicitations were more subject to this effect than were those whose 
referral was attributed to members of the VC team. One explanation is that VCs use the 
preceding interaction with the entrepreneur as an interview, thus adding an additional 
screen to the venture selection process. The solicitation of funds would therefore indicate 
that the entrepreneur had already succeeded in passing the first selection hurdle. 
Alternatively, the VC was looking to keep its options open at a time when it could not 
 
 73 
spend a sufficient level of attention resources on screening, thus blurring the line between 
the screening and evaluation stages. Another possibility in the increased workload is due 
to an effort by the VC to increase the number of incoming solicitations at a particular 
time. This explanation is somewhat supported by the positive correlation between 
workload and solicitations referred by the VC’s members and regional representatives as 
well as solicitations stemming from forums, as these types of referrals are assumed to 
require more activity from the VC. 
 
Another interesting finding is the relatively high effectiveness of catching the 
VC’s attention through participation in entrepreneurial forums. Of all the referral types, 
forum represents the lowest level of resource spending from both the VC and the startup. 
Neither the startup nor the VC has to spend any social capital in order to participate in the 
forum and the monetary expense is relatively small. The effectiveness participation in 
entrepreneurial forums is relatively high for such a small expense. Model 17 in table 3.6 
shows that forums are only 11% worse when compared to all other referral types. This 
result is actually better than the number suggests since this negative effect is mainly due 
to the strong influence of referrals by members of the VC. Since nascent organizations 
are relatively starved when it comes to social capital (Stinchcombe, 1965), and 
considering the extended amount of time and effort necessary to create a useful direct 
relationship with a member of the VC (Hallen, 2007), startups who take advantage of 
entrepreneurial forums as a mechanism to grab investors attention may be able to avoid 






This paper connects entrepreneurial research with the attention-based view of the 
firm and makes theoretical contributions to the decision-making literature. First, this 
study is one of the few in the entrepreneurship domain to explore the theoretical 
underpinning of the VC funding process as a rational decision-making process. The 
internal structure of the venture capital funding process is difficult to observe, thus most 
studies have overcome this limitation by trying to identify and study the criteria that 
affected final funding decisions (Hall and Hofer, 1993; Hisrich and Jankowicz, 1990; 
MacMillan et al., 1985; Shane and Cable, 2002; Shepherd, 1999; Shepherd et al., 2000). 
These studies can be grouped under four general selection criteria: (a) deal origin, (b) the 
business concept, (c) the entrepreneurs’ capabilities, and, (d) the solicitation’s fit with the 
VC’s preferences (Elango et al., 1995; Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Kirsch et al., 2009; 
Smith, 1999). To my knowledge, no other study has tested where in the funding process 
the influence of these criteria is realized. The findings of this study support the 
hypotheses that social referrals serve as signals at the initial screening stage of the VC 
funding process. Future research can further test the effect of direct social interaction 
prior to solicitation by observing its influence on later stages of the VC funding process.  
 
Second, I use attention theory in conjunction with institutional theory to explain 
how firms tackle the conflicting demands of uncertainty and dynamic environments on 
decision-making processes. Firms use comprehensive decision-making processes to 
reduce the risk embedded in decision making under conditions of uncertainty 
(Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1994). However, in dynamic settings firms engage in fast 
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decision making (Judge and Miller, 1991). I suggest that when a dynamic setting prevents 
the firm from using a comprehensive process, signals of legitimacy are used instead. 
Previous research has shown that legitimizing signals affect the outcome of decision-
making processes (Shepherd, 1999). This contributes to our understanding of decision-
making processes by suggesting when such signals are beneficial and why.  
 
This study suffers from several limitations. The finding that an increased 
workload, and therefore an increase demand for the constrained attention resources of the 
firm, results in a reduced reliance on signals is interesting. An alternative explanation can 
stem from a limitation of this study. First, I tested only one out of the four identified 
general criteria for VC decision-making. While the role of social referral as a legitimizing 
heuristic diminishes under increased demand for attention resources, it is possible that the 
importance of other criteria will increase. An answer might lie in a future study designed 
to compare decision-making processes based on more than a single criteria.  
 
The data used in this study is industry specific. The fact that the industry used in 
this study was still in its early stages decreases the generalizability of the findings. An 
empirical solution to this problem would be to test data from several industries with 
different levels of maturity. One of the first problems facing such a study, beyond the 
accumulation of the data, will be to find a decision-making process that is similar enough 
across several industries. Last, since this study is set within a single organization’s 
decision process, the findings may be regarded as firm specific. Although the model of 
VC decision process described in the literature (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984) is similar to 
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the one used by the Focal VC, differences in fund structure and the dynamic settings 
within which VCs operate, may influence the allocation of attention.  
 
Finally, my study has applied the attention-based view of the firm to the 
phenomenon of VC screening and selection. While I have provided initial evidence 
demonstrating the role legitimizing signals have in attracting the attention of decision 
makers under conditions of uncertainty, future research can continue in this path to 
further enrich the our understanding of decision-making processes in dynamic 
environments. For example, while I emphasize the role of sending legitimizing cues, 
future research can test the role of signals of non-conformity on decision makers in 
similar settings. Taken as a whole, my results are most supportive of the premise that 
social ties are the signal VCs look for when screening solicitations. While other selection 
criteria may still play a role in the competition for attention, the results show that the 
likelihood solicitations with referrals will receive further attention from the VC is 45% 
higher. Additionally, the results show if the entrepreneur can arrange meaningful direct 
interaction with the VC prior to solicitation she will fare better by 13% than other 















































































Table 3.1: deal origin 
Origin # 
Focal VC Partner 229 
Entrepreneurial Forums 77 
Focal VC regional Representatives 53 
Professionals (Banker, Lawyer, etc) 153 
Other contact of Focal VC 8 
Unsolicited requests 496 





Table 3.2: descriptive statistics 




d_select 1,003 0.358 0.480 0 1 
d_all_ref 1,003 0.512 0.500 0 1 
d_int_ref 1,003 0.302 0.459 0 1 
d_ext_ref 1,003 0.210 0.408 0 1 
d_other_ref 1,003 0.007 0.083 0 1 
d_pro_ref 1,003 0.152 0.359 0 1 
d_rep_ref 1,003 0.052 0.222 0 1 
d_forum_ref 1,003 0.077 0.266 0 1 
d_personal_ref 1,003 0.225 0.418 0 1 
workload 1,003 57.165 15.433 14 90 
all_refXwload 1,003 29.982 31.100 0 90 
ext_refXwload 1,003 12.012 24.517 0 90 
int_refXwload 1,003 17.970 28.254 0 90 
other_refXload 1,003 0.410 5.119 0 76 
pro_refXwload 1,003 8.376 20.856 0 90 
rep_refXwload 1,003 3.226 14.266 0 90 



















personal_refXwload 1,003 13.313 25.584 0 90 
log_meeting 1,003 2.858 0.447 1.386 3.738 
wy_admitted 1,003 6.651 3.058 1 13 
invst_round 976 2.087 0.779 0 3 
vc_rounds 1,003 718.295 170.215 452 1087 
funded_startups 1,003 717.189 169.756 452 1085 
vc_funds 1,003 6.483 2.207 3.006 11.739 
mt_invest 1,003 12.318 4.754 6.895 22.131 
Nasdaq 1,003 2,179.179 382.208 1,423.190 3,027.190 


















Table 3.3: correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 d_select 1          
2 d_all_ref 0.4911*** 1         
3 d_int_ref 0.3603*** 0.6417*** 1        
4 d_ext_ref 0.1963*** 0.5034*** -0.3396*** 1       
5 d_other_ref 0.0873*** 0.0818*** -0.0552* 0.1624*** 1      
6 d_pro_ref 0.1253*** 0.4122*** -0.2781*** 0.8188*** -0.0354 1     
7 d_rep_ref 0.1256*** 0.2281*** -0.1538*** 0.4530*** -0.0196 -0.0988*** 1    
8 d_forum_ref 0.0816*** 0.2813*** 0.4383*** -0.1488*** -0.0242 -0.1219*** -0.0674** 1   
9 d_personal_ref 0.3440*** 0.5260*** 0.8197*** -0.2784*** -0.0452 -0.2279*** -0.1261*** -0.1555*** 1  
10 workload 0.0066 0.0837*** 0.0977*** -0.0074 0.0211 -0.0537* 0.0654** 0.0784** 0.0574* 1 
11 all_refXwload 0.4225*** 0.9209*** 0.6142*** 0.4375*** 0.0836*** 0.3318*** 0.2361*** 0.2883*** 0.4913*** 0.3511*** 
12 int_refXwload 0.3456*** 0.6282*** 0.9790*** -0.3325*** -0.0540* -0.2722*** -0.1506*** 0.4430*** 0.7936*** 0.1990*** 
13 ext_refXwload 0.1837*** 0.4988*** -0.3365*** 0.9908*** 0.1663*** 0.7980*** 0.4683*** -0.1475*** -0.2758*** 0.0579* 
14 other_refXload 0.0872*** 0.0818*** -0.0552* 0.1624*** 1.0000*** -0.0354 -0.0196 -0.0242 -0.0452 0.0214 
15 pro_refXwload 0.1196*** 0.4104*** -0.2768*** 0.8151*** -0.0353 0.9955*** -0.0984*** -0.1213*** -0.2269*** -0.016 
16 rep_refXwload 0.1232*** 0.2280*** -0.1538*** 0.4528*** -0.0196 -0.0988*** 0.9995*** -0.0674** -0.1261*** 0.0728** 
17 forum_refXwload 0.0812** 0.2810*** 0.4378*** -0.1487*** -0.0241 -0.1217*** -0.0674** 0.9990*** -0.1554*** 0.0881*** 
18 personal_refXwload 0.3366*** 0.5204*** 0.8109*** -0.2754*** -0.0447 -0.2255*** -0.1248*** -0.1539*** 0.9893*** 0.1233*** 
19 log_meeting 0.0158 0.1411*** 0.1832*** -0.0334 0.003 -0.0690** 0.0491 0.1973*** 0.0756** 0.8007*** 
20 invst_round 0.2491*** 0.3160*** 0.2003*** 0.1628*** 0.0419 0.1482*** 0.0445 0.0638** 0.1798*** 0.0012 
21 vc_rounds 0.0029 0.0283 0.0302 0.0007 0.005 -0.0447 0.0716** 0.0178 0.0218 0.6508*** 
22 funded_startups 0.0008 0.0272 0.0291 0.0005 0.005 -0.0452 0.0723** 0.0183 0.0203 0.6555*** 
23 vc_funds -0.0242 0.0211 0.0249 -0.0022 0.0014 -0.0609* 0.0938*** 0.0355 0.0048 0.7577*** 
24 mt_invest -0.0269 0.0456 0.0405 0.0103 -0.0075 -0.0477 0.0989*** 0.045 0.0158 0.7710*** 
25 Nasdaq -0.0552* -0.0016 -0.0105 0.0099 0.0168 -0.05 0.0928*** 0.0073 -0.0162 0.5646*** 
26 nasdaq_change -0.0113 0.0139 0.0593* -0.0497 -0.0298 -0.0315 -0.0293 -0.0067 0.0694** -0.0981*** 
27 nasdaq_max -0.0513 0.0073 -0.0207 0.0323 0.0207 -0.0307 0.1012*** 0.0164 -0.0333 0.5922*** 
 Pairwise correlations reported.    
 * Significant at the 10% level   ** Significant at the 5% level    *** Significant at the 1% level    
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  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11 all_refXwload 1          
12 int_refXwload 0.6588*** 1         
13 ext_refXwload 0.4694*** -0.3294*** 1        
14 other_refXload 0.0838*** -0.0540* 0.1664*** 1       
15 pro_refXwload 0.3509*** -0.2710*** 0.8050*** -0.0353 1      
16 rep_refXwload 0.2401*** -0.1505*** 0.4701*** -0.0196 -0.0983*** 1     
17 forum_refXwload 0.2935*** 0.4466*** -0.1473*** -0.0241 -0.1212*** -0.0673** 1    
18 personal_refXwload 0.5230*** 0.8117*** -0.2729*** -0.0447 -0.2245*** -0.1247*** -0.1537*** 1   
19 log_meeting 0.3532*** 0.2613*** 0.0201 0.0033 -0.0371 0.0547* 0.2038*** 0.1279*** 1  
20 invst_round 0.2768*** 0.1888*** 0.1587*** 0.042 0.1466*** 0.0436 0.0630** 0.1734*** 0.0315 1 
21 vc_rounds 0.1946*** 0.0928*** 0.0416 0.0053 -0.0202 0.0752** 0.0242 0.0632** 0.3838*** -0.0623* 
22 funded_startups 0.1953*** 0.0924*** 0.0418 0.0053 -0.0204 0.0758** 0.0246 0.0624** 0.3912*** -0.0627* 
23 vc_funds 0.2182*** 0.0923*** 0.0501 0.0018 -0.0303 0.0990*** 0.0402 0.0517 0.5644*** -0.0574* 
24 mt_invest 0.2448*** 0.1056*** 0.0661** -0.0071 -0.0152 0.1048*** 0.0505 0.0598* 0.6200*** -0.0376 
25 Nasdaq 0.1465*** 0.0359 0.0515 0.0169 -0.0267 0.0976*** 0.0053 0.0229 0.5349*** -0.0456 
26 nasdaq_change -0.0156 0.0538* -0.0612* -0.0299 -0.0367 -0.0314 -0.0108 0.0713** -0.0680** -0.0039 
27 nasdaq_max 0.1629*** 0.0282 0.0764** 0.0208 -0.0058 0.1065*** 0.0156 0.0061 0.5544*** -0.046 
 Pairwise correlations reported.    
 * Significant at the 10% level   ** Significant at the 5% level    *** Significant at the 1% level    
            
            
  21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29  
21 vc_rounds 1          
22 funded_startups 0.9995*** 1         
23 vc_funds 0.8060*** 0.8131*** 1        
24 mt_invest 0.7226*** 0.7305*** 0.9134*** 1       
25 Nasdaq 0.4490*** 0.4604*** 0.7633*** 0.7632*** 1      
26 nasdaq_change -0.0565* -0.0609* -0.0925*** -0.2182*** 0.0352 1     
27 nasdaq_max 0.4755*** 0.4871*** 0.7871*** 0.8101*** 0.9768*** -0.1241*** 1    
 Pairwise correlations reported.    
 * Significant at the 10% level   ** Significant at the 5% level    *** Significant at the 1% level    
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Table 3.4: logistic regression analysis 
 main1 mfx1 main2 mfx2 main3 mfx3 main4 mfx4 main5 mfx5 
d_all_ref    2.327*** 0.454***       
   (12.980) (16.010)       
d_ext_ref      2.147*** 0.485***     
     (10.290) (11.820)     
d_int_ref      2.471*** 0.537***     
     (12.400) (14.980)     
d_pro_ref        1.948*** 0.448***   
       (8.630) (9.580)   
d_rep_ref        2.529*** 0.554***   
       (7.560) (10.770)   
d_forum_ref        1.940*** 0.450***   
       (6.700) (7.650)   
d_personal_ref        2.650*** 0.578*** 2.653*** 0.579*** 
       (12.450) (15.900) (12.480) (16.030) 
d_notpers_ref          2.093*** 0.464*** 
         (10.690) (12.100) 
log_meeting 0.456** 0.102** 0 0 -0.075 -0.016 -0.005 -0.001 -0.039 -0.008 
 (2.140) (2.150) 0.000  0.000  (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.16) (-0.16) 
invst_round 0.707*** 0.158*** 0.357*** 0.074*** 0.361*** 0.075*** 0.357*** 0.074*** 0.358*** 0.074*** 
 (7.020) (7.150) (3.300) (3.300) (3.330) (3.330) (3.260) (3.270) (3.290) (3.290) 
vc_rounds -0.046 -0.01 -0.041 -0.009 -0.043 -0.009 -0.023 -0.005 -0.026 -0.005 
 (-0.52) (-0.52) (-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.25) (-0.25) 
funded_startups 0.046 0.01 0.041 0.008 0.042 0.009 0.022 0.005 0.025 0.005 
 (0.520) (0.520) (0.400) (0.400) (0.410) (0.410) (0.210) (0.210) (0.250) (0.250) 
vc_funds 0.196 0.044 0.253 0.053 0.238 0.05 0.23 0.048 0.231 0.048 
 (1.310) (1.310) (1.490) (1.490) (1.400) (1.400) (1.340) (1.340) (1.350) (1.350) 
mt_invest -0.088 -0.02 -0.110* -0.023* -0.102 -0.021 -0.109* -0.023* -0.106* -0.022* 
 (-1.61) (-1.61) (-1.78) (-1.78) (-1.63) (-1.63) (-1.73) (-1.74) (-1.69) (-1.70) 
nasdaq -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0 -0.002 0 -0.002 0 -0.002 0 
 (-1.59) (-1.59) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-1.09) (-1.09) (-0.97) (-0.97) 
nasdaq_change 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (0.990) (0.990) (0.330) (0.330) (0.260) (0.260) (0.360) (0.360) (0.220) (0.220) 
nasdaq_max 0.002 0.001 0.002 0 0.002 0 0.002 0 0.002 0 
 (1.380) (1.380) (0.860) (0.860) (0.870) (0.870) (1.020) (1.020) (0.920) (0.920) 
_cons -2.327***  -2.147***  -2.050**  -2.053**  -2.106**  
 (-3.17)  (-2.59)  (-2.46)  (-2.43)  (-2.51)  
N 976 976 976 976 976 976 970 970 976 976 
ll -598.552 -598.552 -493.798 -493.798 -492.377 -492.377 -484.161 -484.161 -489.443 -489.443 
chi2 68.437 68.437 277.944 277.944 280.786 280.786 284.602 284.602 286.655 286.655 
DV - d_select, main and marginal effects are reported.   




Table 3.5: continued logistic regression analysis 
 main6 mfx6 main7 mfx7 main8 mfx8 main9 mfx9 main10 mfx10 
d_all_ref    3.773*** 0.669***       
   (5.160) (7.450)       
d_ext_ref      3.954*** 0.751***     
     (4.890) (9.600)     
d_int_ref      3.603*** 0.715***     
     (4.290) (6.710)     
d_pro_ref        3.623*** 0.707***   
       (4.240) (8.100)   
d_rep_ref        5.859*** 0.759***   
       (3.740) (23.040)   
d_forum_ref        3.990** 0.710***   
       (2.370) (6.510)   
d_personal_ref        3.509*** 0.704*** 3.521*** 0.706*** 
       (4.020) (6.600) (4.030) (6.690) 
d_notpers_ref          3.934*** 0.754*** 
         (4.960) (8.750) 
workload -0.001 0 0.035* 0.007** 0.037** 0.008** 0.033* 0.007* 0.033* 0.007* 
 (-0.06) (-0.06) (1.950) (1.960) (2.040) (2.050) (1.800) (1.810) (1.840) (1.850) 
all_refXwload   -0.025** -0.005**       
   (-2.06) (-2.07)       
ext_refXwload     -0.032** -0.007**     
     (-2.34) (-2.35)     
int_refXwload     -0.02 -0.004     
     (-1.41) (-1.41)     
pro_refXwload       -0.030** -0.006**   
       (-2.05) (-2.06)   
rep_refXwload       -0.054** -0.011**   
       (-2.25) (-2.24)   
forum_refXwload       -0.034 -0.007   
       (-1.25) (-1.25)   
personal_refXwload       -0.015 -0.003 -0.015 -0.003 
       (-1.05) (-1.05) (-1.06) (-1.06) 
notp_refXwload         -0.032** -0.007** 
         (-2.41) (-2.43) 
log_meeting 0.471 0.105 -0.374 -0.077 -0.48 -0.1 -0.339 -0.07 -0.364 -0.076 
 (1.390) (1.390) (-0.95) (-0.95) (-1.22) (-1.22) (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.93) (-0.93) 
invst_round 0.707*** 0.158*** 0.345*** 0.072*** 0.349*** 0.072*** 0.342*** 0.070*** 0.345*** 0.072*** 
 (7.010) (7.140) (3.180) (3.190) (3.210) (3.210) (3.100) (3.110) (3.150) (3.160) 
vc_rounds -0.046 -0.01 -0.059 -0.012 -0.061 -0.013 -0.032 -0.007 -0.039 -0.008 
 (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.57) (-0.57) (-0.59) (-0.59) (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.37) (-0.37) 
funded_startups 0.045 0.01 0.057 0.012 0.06 0.012 0.031 0.006 0.038 0.008 
 (0.510) (0.510) (0.560) (0.560) (0.580) (0.580) (0.300) (0.300) (0.370) (0.370) 
vc_funds 0.196 0.044 0.257 0.053 0.247 0.051 0.223 0.046 0.241 0.05 
 (1.310) (1.310) (1.510) (1.510) (1.440) (1.440) (1.280) (1.290) (1.400) (1.400) 
mt_invest -0.087 -0.019 -0.125* -0.026* -0.118* -0.024* -0.112* -0.023* -0.118* -0.025* 
 (-1.54) (-1.54) (-1.94) (-1.95) (-1.82) (-1.83) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.83) (-1.84) 
nasdaq -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0 -0.002 0 -0.002 0 -0.002 0 
 (-1.59) (-1.59) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-1.10) (-1.11) (-0.94) (-0.94) 
nasdaq_change 0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (0.990) (0.990) (0.190) (0.190) (0.140) (0.140) (0.290) (0.290) (0.130) (0.130) 
nasdaq_max 0.002 0.001 0.001 0 0.002 0 0.002 0 0.002 0 
 (1.380) (1.380) (0.740) (0.740) (0.830) (0.830) (1.050) (1.050) (0.910) (0.910) 
_cons -2.340***  -2.755***  -2.630***  -2.611***  -2.684***  
 (-3.02)  (-2.77)  (-2.64)  (-2.59)  (-2.68)  
N 976 976 976 976 976 976 970 970 976 976 
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ll -598.55 -598.55 -491.051 -491.051 -488.971 -488.971 -479.746 -479.746 -485.988 -485.988 
chi2 68.44 68.44 283.439 283.439 287.598 287.598 293.431 293.431 293.564 293.564 
DV - d_select, main and marginal effects are reported.  




Table 3.6: additional logistic regression analysis 
 mfx11 mfx12 mfx13 mfx14 mfx15 mfx16 mfx17 mfx18 mfx19 mfx20 
workload  0.003  0.004  0.005  0.003  0.001 
  (0.600)  (0.940)  (1.010)  (0.670)  (0.310) 
d_int_ref0  0.082* -0.085         
 (1.720) (-0.46)         
int_ref0Xwload  0.003         
  (0.930)         
d_rep_ref0    0.063 0.355**       
   (0.850) (2.150)       
rep_ref0Xwload    -0.007       
    (-1.19)       
d_pro_ref0      -0.145*** -0.075     
     (-2.85) (-0.39)     
pro_ref0Xwload      -0.001     
      (-0.39)     
d_forum_ref0        -0.116* 0.054   
       (-1.75) (0.140)   
forum_ref0Xwload        -0.003   
        (-0.42)   
d_personal_ref0          0.134*** -0.103 
         (2.960) (-0.54) 
personal_ref0Xwload          0.004 
          (1.260) 
log_meeting -0.02 -0.11 0.014 -0.065 -0.03 -0.117 0.038 -0.021 -0.004 -0.066 
 (-0.27) (-0.92) (0.190) (-0.55) (-0.40) (-0.99) (0.510) (-0.18) (-0.05) (-0.56) 
invst_round 0.057* 0.056* 0.056* 0.054* 0.058* 0.058* 0.054* 0.053* 0.055* 0.054* 
 (1.840) (1.820) (1.830) (1.770) (1.880) (1.870) (1.740) (1.710) (1.780) (1.740) 
vc_rounds -0.044 -0.047 -0.043 -0.044 -0.045 -0.048 -0.038 -0.04 -0.039 -0.04 
 (-1.46) (-1.54) (-1.42) (-1.45) (-1.47) (-1.55) (-1.25) (-1.30) (-1.27) (-1.29) 
funded_startups 0.044 0.047 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.047 0.038 0.04 0.038 0.039 
 (1.450) (1.530) (1.420) (1.440) (1.460) (1.540) (1.240) (1.290) (1.260) (1.280) 
vc_funds 0.110** 0.113** 0.117** 0.112** 0.108** 0.110** 0.118** 0.118** 0.109** 0.113** 
 (2.170) (2.220) (2.300) (2.220) (2.120) (2.140) (2.320) (2.320) (2.140) (2.210) 
mt_invest -0.044** -0.049** -0.048*** -0.049** -0.044** -0.049** -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.046** -0.050*** 
 (-2.35) (-2.54) (-2.60) (-2.56) (-2.35) (-2.54) (-2.71) (-2.78) (-2.46) (-2.59) 
nasdaq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (0.160) (0.170) (0.100) (0.130) (0.140) (0.220) (0.030) (0.110) (0.100) (0.040) 
nasdaq_change 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (-0.96) (-1.04) (-0.81) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-1.04) (-0.82) (-0.91) (-1.00) (-1.06) 
nasdaq_max 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.03) (-0.09) (-0.06) (-0.00) 
N 496 496 496 496 496 496 496 496 496 496 
ll -324.599 -323.759 -325.735 -324.6 -322.016 -321.509 -324.54 -324.253 -321.82 -320.814 
chi2 24.109 25.79 21.838 24.107 29.276 30.289 24.227 24.802 29.668 31.678 
DV - d_select, main and marginal effects are reported.  






TARGETED SIGNALS:  
HOW DO VENTURE CAPITAL FIRMS AND ANGEL 






This essay tests whether signals are target specific. I use startups’ solicitation of funding 
from both Angel investors and Venture Capital firms to learn the respective roles of the 
legitimizing and informative aspects of interfirm signals. The test considers the structure 
of the signal and the differences between the two types of private equity investors. I show 
that the structure of the signal predicts which type of receiver is likely to respond 
favorably to the solicitation.   
 
 






Due to the inherent information asymmetry between young startups and early 
investors, and the uncertainty of investment outcome, potential investors tend to ignore 
some of the information a startup provides due to concerns over misrepresentation or 
omission (Spence, 1976). One of the main methods startups use to provide information 
early in the solicitation process is to submit planning documentation, such as business 
plans or executive summaries, to the solicited investors (Kirsch, Goldfarb, & Gera, 2009; 
MacMillan & Narasimha, 1987; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). Upon reviewing the submitted 
documents, investors may treat statements regarding the potential of the venture 
cautiously and search for valid alternative signals of value (Downes & Heinkel, 1982; 
Spence, 1973). When the quality or potential value of investment opportunities is 
uncertain, investors cannot select investment opportunities by comparing the startups 
themselves (Podolny, 1994). Instead, investors will rely on signals of economic value that 
they perceive as genuine, and disregard suspicious information. A signal is a course of 
action by a seller that conveys information to the buyer by varying systematically with 
the product quality. The effectiveness of a signal depends on the inherent credibility of 
that signal. Specifically, for a signal to be valuable it must be costly to obtain and 
difficult to imitate (Spence, 1973). In top echelon research, studies of Top Management 
Team (TMT) and Board of Directors (BOD) structures suggest that the structure and 
composition of the firm’s top echelon serves both as a resource and as a signal of 
legitimacy to potential investors. While both TMT and BOD descriptions are usually part 
of the documentation submitted during solicitation, the verifiable nature of biodata makes 
it useful for reducing information asymmetry. Moreover, the fact that most of the 
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information within the biodata of top echelon members consists of experiences 
accumulated prior to joining a soliciting venture converts it into a signal to the quality of 
the venture. Extant research has shown that investors rely on the size and composition of 
both the TMT and the BOD as valuable signals when deciding on IPO investments. Top 
echelon structure affects the success of IPOs through recruiting prestigious underwriters 
(Higgins & Gulati, 2003), influencing the IPO’s underpricing (Cohen & Dean, 2005), 
increasing IPO size (Finkle, 1998), advancing the initial offering performance (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003), and creating  alliance opportunities (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  
 
In this essay I use the solicitation documentation and in particular the description 
of the startups’ top echelon, to study how signals attract different types of investors. I 
suggest that the differences between the signal interpretation abilities of business angel 
investors and venture capital firms determine which signal aspect will be more effective 
in influencing their investment decisions. Thus, I suggest signals are target specific. 
 
Theory and Background  
Researchers of private equity investors suggest there are several distinct types of 
investors. Broadly, private equity investors can be segmented in two groups: formal and 
informal (Fenn, Liang, & Prowse, 1995). The dominant form for formal private equity 
investment is commonly known today as venture capital (VC) investment. These 
organizations are usually formed as limited partnerships, where institutional investors are 
the limited partners and the investment managers are general partners. Informal investors 
are private investors, which are further segmented into two groups: accredited and non 
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accredited individual investors. Accredited individual investors are wealthy individuals 
whose personal assets exceed US$1,000,000 or whose yearly income in the past two 
years was more than US$200,0009. Unaccredited individual investors are investors whose 
income is below the aforementioned threshold. Typically the unaccredited segment 
consists of family and friends of the entrepreneur.  
 
Accredited investors are also known as angel investors, a term that is still vaguely 
defined. In some circles the definition of an angel investor relates only to professional 
investors, those accredited investors whose business is to invest in nascent firms; this 
definition excludes affluent people who do not invest the majority of their effort in 
searching for and interacting with entrepreneurs. Hence, the CEO of a Fortune 1000 firm, 
who is also an accredited investor in a startup, will not be considered a business angel 
according to this definition. Under this view business angels are typically successful 
entrepreneurs who invest in the startup financially and professionally, i.e. after funding 
the startup monetarily the angel uses her business acumen and experience as a successful 
entrepreneur to help the startup succeed. On the other hand, the opposite perception also 
exits. In this opposite view angel investors are seen as unsophisticated, or casual 
investors whose sole function is to provide the startup with funds that will allow it to 
survive until it receives some future investment from a formal investor. This point-of-
view separates informal investors based on their professional distance from the 
entrepreneur and perhaps the magnitude of the investment, rather than their accreditation 
or profession. Thus, in this view the Fortune 1000 CEO would be considered an angel 
                                                 
9 Note that formal investors are also considered accredited investors by the SEC. See Appendix A for the 
complete SEC definition of an accredited investor. 
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investor. I view VC funds as representatives of formal private equity investors and angel 
investors as informal investors. For the purpose of this essay I define angel investors as 
all non accredited investors, and accredited investors whose investment was not depicted 
as VC investment in investment tracking databases such as VentureXpert. I select this 
definition for methodological reasons rather than theoretical ones. The definition of the 
exact typology of angel investors is beyond the immediate scope of this study. The goal 
of this study is to determine if VCs and business angels differ in their signal 
interpretation capabilities and how this influences the relative solicitation results. 
 
Between the two types of investors, the angel investor is the more common source 
of private equity financing, especially with smaller rounds of financing, typically less 
than US$500,000. Fenn and Liang (Fenn & Liang, 1998) find that 60% of entrepreneurs 
receive funding from angel investment while only 10% receive VC funds. It might be 
harder to identify an angel investor than a VC fund, since wealthy individuals do not 
routinely advertize their existence or investment intentions. However, soliciting the funds 
from both sources is challenging. The deal process of angel investors is shorter than that 
of VC firms, and financing with angels is less expensive for the startup (Freear, Sohl, & 
Wetzel, 1995). Venture capital funds usually fund later in the startup’s life cycle than 
angel investors and with bigger investments (Freear & Wetzel, 1990). While most of the 
time angels and VCs invest in complementing funding rounds, some rounds’ fundraising 
targets are reached by a combination of angels and VC financing (Harrison & Mason, 
2000), although angels are usually absent from the better-performing large deals 





Recent research supports the argument that angel investors and venture capital 
firms differ in their investment selection criteria. Business angels often take bigger risks, 
accept lower rewards, and receive weaker controls than venture capitalists do, and have 
longer exit horizons (Lerner, 1998; Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 1994; Sohl, 1999, 2003). 
These findings suggest that VCs’ returns on investments are better than those of business 
angels. As individual investors, angels have limited resources for signal interpretation 
when compared to VC firms. While the VC’s limited partners rely on the expertise of 
their investment partners, and other hired personnel, for evaluation of investment 
opportunities, angel investors have to rely on their own personal experience and 
judgment of the startup and it’s potential. While venture capitalists are considered highly 
experienced experts in their fields, business angel are much less homogeneous as a group 
(Lerner, 1998; Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 1994), which implies that their venture 
investment skills will be lower on average. According to signaling theory the findings 
that VCs’ ROI is better than business angels’ ROI and that it is achieved at a lower risk 
level imply that VCs have higher signal identification and interpretation abilities than 
business angels. Given that VCs invest in later stages than business angels do, one can 
expect that startups at this stage will be able to produce more signals and that these 
signals will be clearer. If VCs’ signal receiving abilities are indeed higher then those of 
angel investors, then according to proposition 4 (chapter 2) VCs will base their 
investment decisions on the informative aspect of the signal. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: the informative aspect of the signal will have a higher impact on 




According to one view of angels, business angels are experienced entrepreneurs 
with successful and profitable past ventures who continue to yearn for excitement (Sohl, 
1999). When compared to VCs, angels’ investments are typically in markets with 
technologies that are similar to the angels’ experience, and in situations in which the 
angel investor will be able to be a value-adding investor and exercise a hands-on 
approach (Prasad, Bruton, & Vozikis, 2000). Angels also prefer investments that are 
closer geographically. Thus, business angels can be seen as relatively similar to the 
entrepreneur both geographically and professionally. Heil and Robertson (1991) propose 
that the higher the similarity between the signaler and the receiver the higher the number 
of signals the receiver will identify, and the higher the accuracy of the signals’ 
interpretation will be. This suggests that one reason business angels are willing to take 
higher risks is because their signal interpretation abilities are high. However, there is 
other evidence that suggests that as a group business angels are not homogeneous in their 
capabilities (Freear, Sohl and Wetzel, 1994; Lerner, 1998). According to this view a 
business angel is any informal investor in early stage ventures. For example, an angel can 
be an affluent individual without experience in venture funding who seeks to diversify his 
investments and invests in a particular startup due to geographical proximity. It appears 
that separating professional angel investors from other individual investors, including 
those who fall under the definition of friends and family, is problematic. Since in this 
study I group all investments who are not recognized as VC funding as angel investments 
I must subscribe to the latter view of angel/ Thus, I assume that on average the 
professional distance of angels from entrepreneurs might be higher than that of 
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professional venture capitalists. Thus suggests that angel investors will be less likely to 
interpret signal correctly, i.e. on average, business angel investors have lower signal 
interpretation skills than professional venture capitalists. According to proposition 2 
(chapter 2) interpreters with lower abilities will rely more on the legitimizing aspect of 
the signal, hence, I propose that angel investment decisions will be more influenced by 
the legitimizing aspect of the signal rather than the informative aspect of the signal.  
 
Since the debate on the signal interpretation of angels can be taken in both 
directions, pending on the definition of business angels as a group, it is important to 
consider the relative position on the venture life cycle that angels and VCs take. Business 
angel investors typically invest in earlier stage startups (Sohl, 1999, 2003). Younger 
ventures are typically less accomplished than more mature ventures. Hence, the younger 
startup will be able to generate a lower number of signals, which, in accordance with 
proposition 5 (chapter 2), will enhance the prominence of the legitimizing aspect of the 
signal. Thus it appears that even if we consider angel investors’ signal interpretation 
abilities to be similar to those of VCs, the timeframe in the venture life-cycle in which 
they invest will enhance the influence of the legitimizing aspect of the signal. Therefore, I 
suggest that angels will base their decisions on the legitimizing aspect of the signals. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: the legitimizing aspect of the signal will have a higher impact on 
business angels’ investments decisions than the informative aspect of the signal. 
 
To summarize, angel investors differ from VC firms in terms of demographics, 
preferences of investment selection criteria, size of investment, investment terms, and 
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post investment activities. In addition, business angels invest earlier in the life of startups 
than VCs. Thus, angels and VCs differ in the signals they look for and the types of targets 
they seek. Moreover, due to the inherent differences in size, structure, and expertise 
between formal and informal private equity investors, angels and VCs differ in their 
signal interpretation abilities. Due to the differences in entity size and structure, VCs’ 
signaling resources are more abundant and potentially superior in ability. Additionally, 
by definition, the demographics of business angels consist of a much wider group than 
those of VC investment managing partners, which would suggest a wider disparity in 
signaling interpretation abilities. Thus, I suggest that VCs, who (when compared to 
business angels) have more available resources for signal interpretation, and therefore 
according to proposition 3 (chapter2) VCs will be able to delve deeper into the signal’s 
interpretation recursion than business angels would. Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 2: VC investment decisions are more likely to be influenced by deeper 




To test if interfirm signals are indeed target specific I look at how nascent 
ventures offer investment opportunities to private equity investors. I use a sample of 
funding solicitations submitted to an investment broker between January 1998 and 
February 2003. The investment broker was working for an investment management firm 
located in the U.S. Northwest. Over 70% of the solicitations were from technology based 
startups, which reflects the time and region in which the broker resided. Nonetheless, the 
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sample contains solicitations from startups in a variety of industries including aerospace, 
retail, banking, fishery, internet security, and sports. According to the findings of chapter 
3, the solicitations in this sample have a better than normal chance of receiving attention 
from the potential investors since all of the startups in this sample are utilizing a network 
referral (the broker) in their solicitation. 
 
The sample consists of 830 funding requests for which the broker maintained 
either paper or electronic records. These records include a log of incoming solicitations, 
business plans, power point presentations, and other documents. All records were 
preserved as part of the broker’s internal processes and donated to research. 
 
Three hundred twelve of these requests contained some sort of documentation; 72 
submitted a full business plan and 199 an executive summary (23 submitted both). One 
hundred ten solicitations included other documents, and 62 of those did not have either a 
business plan or an executive summary. From these 312 requests, I coded data from any 
document that was submitted to the venture capitalist. Two hundred forty eight of these 
312 requests contained management team information. These 248 requests describe 1,541 
individuals. 957 served in managerial roles, 342 served on boards of directors and 352 on 
advisory boards, only 2 served in multiple roles yet 82 people appear without a clear 
purpose. 229 individuals are noted as founders. The average management team had 3.86 
individuals, while the largest had 16 people. The largest number of people described in 




To identify which solicitation received private equity funding, and of what type, I 
retrieved SEC’s archives for submissions of Form D by the soliciting startups within the 
appropriate time frame. When making private offerings of stock, firms need to conform 
to the SEC regulation D. Regulation D aims to protect the investors and stipulates the 
necessary divulging of information based on the accreditation of the investor. Not all of 
the solicitations described the type of investor they are searching for, but all of those who 
did searched for “accredited investors” only. Accredited investors are either investment 
organizations or individuals whose personal wealth is larger than a minimum set by the 
SEC (See Appendix A for the complete definition). Two hundred and thirteen firms 
received investment in the 6 months following their interaction with the investment 
broker, 49 of these investments were made by VCs and are found in VentureXpert. The 
biggest investment was $54.7M. The average received investment was $2,687,481. On 
average each investment was raised by about 16 entities, and the largest investment team 
had 170 investors. Only 11 investments in the sample were made by non accredited 
investors. The average accredited investor invested almost $365,000 while the average 
non accredited investor contributed less than $40,000. (See table 4.1 for more details). 
 
=============================== 





Dependent Variable  
Investment. I test whether a startup succeeded in soliciting an investor using a 
binary dummy variable−d_invst−that indicates if a form D was submitted to the SEC in 
the 180 days following the date of solicitation. The six month period was specified in 
several solicitation documents as the target to concluding the round.  
 
VC Funding. The dummy variable−d_vc−receives the value of 1 if the Form D 
funding event was reported in VentureXpert as a VC funding round, and 0 if the funding 
event was not found in VentureXpert or if the startup did not secure any funding. Forty 
nine of the funding events are reported as VC rounds. 
  
Angel Funding. The dummy variable−d_angel−receives the value of 1 if the Form 
D funding event was not reported in VentureXpert, and 0 if the funding was made by a 
VC (per d_vc) or the startup failed to secure funding. One hundred and sixty four of the 
funding events are reported as angel rounds. 
 
=============================== 
Insert Table 4.2 about here 
=============================== 
 
Independent Variables  
Kirsch at al (2009) tested a different dataset of funding solicitations with similar 
documentation characteristics. Although the particular usage of the variable is not 
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completely similar, the following variable description follows their variable identification 
where appropriate.  
 
Previous Investment. For each of startups in the solicitation who received funding 
I coded previous funding events by using Form Ds submitted from January 1997 onward. 
Thus, I was able to capture if the startup had previously received funding. As noted 
earlier, 213 of the 830 solicitations secured funding. Of those, 168 have reported previous 
investments to the SEC, 15 of which were made by VCs according to VentureXpert. 
 
Document Type: While there is significant variance in the types of documents 
within the funding requests, a single dummy variable is used to test is the type of 
submitted document serves as a signal. The use of an executive summary or a full 
business plan as a solicitation document became the standard due to coercive, mimetic 
and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983). VCs regularly ask for a 
business plan on their web sites. Business plans are commonly used in entrepreneurship 
contests and business schools’ entrepreneurship seminars emphasize its importance. 
Thus, a startup might use the document’s format to legitimize the information it wants to 
transfer to the potential investor. Thus, the document type is the first layer of the signal’s 
recursion. Out of the 312 solicitations that contained documents, 72 have submitted a 
business plan and 199 submitted an executive summary; 23 of those submitted both. The 
dummy variable d_bp_es takes the value of 1 if the solicitation contained a business 




Document Substance. To capture the informative aspect of the submitted 
documentation, the documents of each solicitation were graded for clarity. I graded each 
of the solicitations on the presentation of the following subjects: (1) the Product or 
Service Process; (2) the Target Market/Industry Analysis; (3) the Value Proposition (i.e., 
why the product or process was an appropriate solution to a problem in the target 
market); (4) the startup’s Competition and its Competitive Advantage; (5) the current 
Business Stage; (6) the Top Management Team and Boards; (7) the Marketing Plan; (8) 
the startup’s Financials and (9) the Revenue Model. These nine sections are commonly 
referred to in entrepreneurship textbooks (cf., Timmons and Spinelli, 2007, 229 or Baron 
and Shane, 2005, 169). Each section received a score between 0 and 5 based on the depth 
and clarity of the topic’s description. Thus, I was not trying to assess the accuracy or 
correctness of the presented data, rather I aimed to see if the startup covered the 
important issues in each topic and if after reading the section I have understood the 
subject. A section was scored 0 if it was not covered at all and 5 if it was complete and 
easy to understand. For example, the management team section received a score of 1 if it 
contained only a list of names or if most of the names did not have a title, if the 
description consisted of names and functions for all team members it received a score of 
2. The section received a score of 3 if each individual had rudimentary description 
attached (e.g. “Joe has 12 years of experience in commercial banking”). If the person’s 
history included the names of previous employers, position titles and education history 
(including institution) the score was either 4 or 5. A score of 5 was given if all the team 
members were described to this level and 4 if the description of some was lacking, which 




The variable overalldoc sums the solicitation’s documents’ grade as a whole on 
the scale of 0 to 5. The score is calculated as the combined score of all the sections, 
divided by the number of sections that exist in the solicitations’ documents. I also created 
the variable plan_comp, which is the sum of the score of all nine sections. Since the goal 
of this variable is to capture the informative aspect of the submitted documentation as a 
signal I use overalldoc, whose interpretation is less ambiguous10. 
 
Financial Information Representation. This variable grades the representation of 
the startup’s financial revenue and profit model. Documentation which contained only 
text received a score of 1 while those who’s financial section included tabulation 
conforming to accounting reporting norms were graded as 5. This grades only the form of 
the financial model and excludes the coder’s reservations concerning the validity of the 
assumptions within the model. Thus, this variable represents the legitimizing aspect of 
the financial information within the solicitation’s documentation. 
 
Human capital: The documents of 248 contain basic information about members 
of the management team, board of directors, and advisory board. Typically the 
documents provide the following information: name, title, education, professional 
background and prior entrepreneurial experience. These biodata allows the creation of 
multiple variables representing the startups’ human capital. 
 
                                                 
10 Since plan_comp accounts for the completeness of the structure and the substance within it, its 
interpretation as a representative of either the legitimizing or the informative aspect of the signal can be 
questioned. Generally, the two variables followed the same behavior pattern in the regression models. 
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Founder. The variable d_founder indicates if the startup’s founders are still part 
of the top management team and counts their number. 132 startups had as many as three 
founders in management positions. On average a startup had less than a single founder 
(0.86) onboard. This variable represents the legitimizing aspect of the signal; the 
informative aspect of the founders’ contribution to the startup is captured in the variables 
representing the founders’ education and experience. Since none of these informative 
aspects of the signal were ever significant they were omitted from the regression models 
and are not reported in this text. 
 
Team completeness and specialization. Following Sine et al. (2006), I implement 
a measure of team completeness (team_completeness) as the number of managerial roles 
reported in the planning documents. I captured a total of 17 management positions: 
Chairman; Chief Executive Officer; Business Administration; Chief Financial Officer; 
Marketing; Corporate Development; Chief Engineering Officer; Human Resources; 
International Sales; Manufacturing; Management of Information Systems; Purchasing; 
Quality Control; Research & Development; Sales; Strategic Planning; Technology 
Transfer; and Nonisomorphic role or Insufficient Information provided for classification. 
A higher score reflects higher team completeness. The variable max_rolls counts the 
maximum number of roles a person filled in a startup. The higher the number of rolls a 
person juggles the lower the specialization of the startup. On average a team member had 
more than a single area (1.36) under his supervision and a maximum of 4. Since the role 
of these variables is to represent the informative aspect of the signal, I use the 
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specialization variable max_rolls, which is less ambiguous of the two, in the regression 
models.   
 
Educational Human Capital: Using the reported educational achievements of the 
startup’s top echelon I created degree counters for the top management team, board of 
directors, and advisory board. The variable tmt_degree sums the number of university 
degrees (doctorate, graduate, and undergraduate levels) reported for members of the 
startup who also hold managerial positions. On average the top management team had 
1.57 members with higher education degrees reported (with a maximum of 9). Similarly, 
the variable ab_n_bod_degree captures the same information for members of the board of 
directors and the advisory board (average of 0.42 and maximum of 7). The TMT’s 
educational capital is a direct indication of the capabilities of the startup, hence it 
represents the informative aspect of the signal. On the other hand, the BOD educational 
information relates to entities that are external to the startup and is therefore indirect. 
Hence it represents the legitimizing aspect of the signal. 
 
Professional Experience: From the summary biographies I extracted work 
histories, professional, and entrepreneurial experience. Experience is calculated as the 
sum of individual professional experience (in months) the startup has. I created separate 






Stock Exchange. I created three variables of the NASDAQ stock exchange to 
further help control the effect of time, industry, and external factors. First I captured the 
weekly closing position of the NASDAQ; second I captured the maximum position of the 
NASDAQ at each week, and last, I estimated the weekly trend by calculating the 
difference between the NASDAQ starting and closing position each week. Since all three 
variables yield basically the same results, only the closing variable—nasdaq_close—is 
reported in the regression models. 
 
 
VC Investments. I captured the quarterly sum of VC investments (in billions) as 
recorded on PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ MoneyTree. 
 
Timing of Request: I captured the date of funding request. The date is represented 
by the variable yr_qtr.  
 
Analysis and Results 
 
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics and table 4.3 reports the correlations of 
all the hypothesized as well as control variables. There is a strong positive correlation 
between all the dependent variables (DV) and the previous investment indicator 
d_prev_invst. The general investment DV (d_invst) is also correlated to the financial 
presentation variable (qualpress) and to the control variables nasdaq_close and 
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mt_qtr_vc_amount. Investment by VCs (d_vc) is negatively correlated to the submission 
of business documentation (d_bp_es) and is positively correlated with the management 
team specialization variable (max_rolls), these directions are supportive to hypothesis 1a. 
The business angels DV (d_angel), also has a strong positive correlation with the 
NASDAQ and the PWC MoneyTree control variables, and marginal correlation to the 
legitimizing variable aspects d_founder and qualpress, which supports hypothesis 1b. All 
other independent variables are not correlated with the DVs. There is a strong and 
significant correlation between several of the independent variables (IV), specifically 
between the document type indicator d_bp_es and the document substance (overalldoc) 
and the financial presentation variable (qualpress). This is not surprising, considering the 
multilayered structure of the signal.  
 
There is also strong positive correlation within the education and experience 
variables. Only one IV—d_prev_invst—is not significantly correlated to any of the other 
IVs. These correlations suggest that using a combination of these variables in a regression 
model may result in multicolinearity.  
 
= = = = = = = = = = 
Insert Table 4.3 about here 
= = = = = = = = = 
 
Table 4.4 reports the results from the logistic regressions on the investment 
indicator d_invst. In models 1 through 10 the regression is run on each of the IVs in 
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combination with the control variables only. These models show that the single most 
influential predictor of receiving funding is the indication of previous external funding 
round(s) (βd_prev_invst=2.622, p<.01). These results affirm the findings by Kirsch et al. 
(2009) who found that business plans were not a good predictor of venture capital 
funding. In models 11 through 18 (see Table 4.5) I gradually combine the IVs in an effort 
to control for multicolinearity. First I pair the IVs according to relevancy in models 11 to 
15; model 16 contains all six variables found within the solicitations’ documentation; I 
then add the initial layer signals (d_prev_invst and d_bp_es) one by one in models 17 and 
18. This gradual addition allows me to evaluate the possible existence of multicolinearity 
in each model. The pairwise models (11 -15) do not show dramatic changes from the 
single IV models. Two significant changes are observed in model 16. First, the document 
substance variable (overalldoc) is almost 8 times stronger in the presence of the other 
IVs, and it has changed its direction. Second, TMT education variable (tmt_degree) has 
also changed its sign, although not its size. The addition of d_prev_invst in model 17 
reduces overalldoc to a quarter of its previous magnitude. Finally, the addition of the 
document type indicator flips the sign of overalldoc once more, and d_bp_es itself is 
stronger, although that should be expected given the presence of signals from deeper 
recursion levels. While none of these changes is significant, this does indicate that there 
is a good reason to expect multicolinearity in the complete model (18) and that statistical 
significance that is only visible in the complete model should be treated as suspect. 
 
= = = = = = = = = = 




Insert Table 4.5 about here 
= = = = = = = = = 
 
The following regression models for d_vc and d_angel as the DV are structured in 
the same fashion as the previous test was for d_invst and differ only in the use of the DV. 
Models 1a through 18a (tables 4.6 and 4.7) utilize the VentureXpert indicator d_vc, this 
DV takes the value of 1 if the funding event has a corresponding event in VentureXpert, 
indicating that this is a VC funding. Model 1a tests the influence of document type, a 
legitimizing aspect of the signal, on the probability of being funded by a VC. The 
variable d_bp_es includes both business plans and executive summaries as solicitation 
documents. The submission of normative business documents has a negative and 
significant (βd_bp_es=-1. 293, p<.05) influence on receiving VC funding. This result 
suggests that startups who submit business plans and executive summaries in their 
solicitations are less likely to receive funding from a VC firm. Model 2a tests the 
influence of evidence of previous funding, an informative aspect of the signal, on the 
probability of being funded by a VC. The variable d_prev_invst indicates whether the 
startup has reported any past funding round to the SEC. The evidence of a previous round 
of funding has a positive and significant (βd_prev_invst=1. 932, p<.01) influence on the 
probability of securing VC funds. The combined results of model 1a and 2a show that the 
informative aspect of the signal positively influences VC funding decisions while the 
legitimizing aspect of the signal predicts angel investment or no investment at all, which 




The variables document substance, financial model presentation, TMT education 
and experience, and the boards’ members’ education and experience (models 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 
8, and 10 respectively) do not show significance. In model 6, team specialization has 
marginal significance (βmax_rolls=1.102, p<.10). This indicates that the higher the 
maximum number of areas a management team member is in-charge of, the higher its 
likelihood of receiving VC funding. Model 11a (Table 4.7) combines models 1a and 2a. 
Both indicators keep their direction and continue to be significant, though the 
significance of the document type variable is reduced to marginal (βd_bp_es =-1.095, 
p<.10; βd_prev_invst=1. 611, p<.01). The TMT specialization variable also keeps its 
marginal significance with the addition of d_founder (in model 13), and other variables 
(in models 16-18), while the educational, experience, and documents’ content are 
insignificant in all models. Interestingly, the document type indicator loses its 
significance in the full model (18a) while the founders’ indicator gains marginal 
significance in the presence of d_prev_invst. These results further suggest that the 
informative aspect of the signal has a higher influence on VC funding decisions than the 
legitimizing aspect of the signal. Therefore H1a is supported.  
 
In models 1b through 18b (tables 4.8 and 4.9) I use as DV the angel investment 
indicator d_angel, which takes the value of 1 if the funding event doesn’t have a 
corresponding event in VentureXpert. As before, model 1b tests the influence of d_bp_es 
on the probability of being funded by a business angel. The variable d_bp_es includes 
both business plans and executive summaries as solicitation documents. The submission 
 
 108 
of normative business documents is not significant. Model 2b tests the influence of 
evidence of previous funding, an informative aspect of the signal, on the probability of 
being funded by an angel investor. The variable d_prev_invst indicates if the startup have 
reported to the SEC any funding round in its past. The evidence of a previous round of 
funding has a positive and significant (βd_prev_invst=1. 778, p<.01) influence on the 
probability of securing angel funds, which is in he opposite direction to the suggested 
theory. The combined results of models 1b and 2b show that the informative aspect of the 
signal positively influences an angel funding decisions while the legitimizing aspect of 
the signal does not, which negates H1b.  
 
The variables document substance, financial model presentation, TMT 
specialization, education and experience and the boards’ members’ education and 
experience (models 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 8, and 10 respectively) do not show significance. In 
model 5, the founder indicator has marginal significance (βd_founder=0.368, p<.10). While 
indicating that angels are attuned to different signals than VCs, this does not negate the 
findings from models 1b & 2b. Model 11b (Table 4.9) combines model 1b with 2b. Both 
indicators keep their direction and significance levels. The significance of d_founder is 
lost in the presence of d_prev_invst in models 17b-18b. The educational, experience and 
documents’ content variables are insignificant in all relevant models. These results 
suggest that the informative aspect of the signal has a higher influence of angel funding 




To supplement these models I created another DV d_ba_vc in which all 
solicitations without an investment event are dropped. This variable takes the value of 1 
when the investment event appears in VentureXpert and 0 if the event is not in 
VentureXpert. Since the majority of the observations are dropped in this model, the test 
sample size is relatively small. Thus, these results should be considered as an addendum 
for the previous results from previous models. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 follow the same 
model development structure as before. The results in models 1c through 18c help to 
establish the previous findings. The findings suggest that the informative aspect of the 
signal (βd_prev_invst=0.658, p<.10; βmax_rolls=1. 250, p<.10) influences the investment 
decisions of VCs, while the legitimizing aspect of the signal (βd_bp_es=1.341, p<.05; 
βd_founder=-0. 965, p<.05) influences the decisions of angel investors. Thus, H1a and b are 
supported. The result does not change as the prediction models become more complex. 
However, both d_bp_es and d_prev_invst lose their significance in the presence of deeper 
layer signals. This finding contradicts hypothesis 2, as there is no evidence that the 
signals influencing VCs and angels differ in the signal’s layer-depth. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this essay I test if receivers differ in their utilization of the received signal. To 
accomplish this I utilize a new dataset of investment solicitations from nascent ventures. 
These solicitations were submitted to a single deal broker in the US Northwest between 
1998 and 2003. The solicitations’ documentation, and especially the description of each 
startup’s top echelon therein, is the signal the venture sends to the receiver. The receivers 
 
 110 
of the solicitations are private equity investors. Commonly, private equity investors are 
segmented into two main groups: angel investors and venture capital firms. Research 
shows these segments differ on several aspects. Angel investors are wealthy individuals 
who invest their own money, while VCs are limited partnerships where the managers 
who make the investment decisions are not the general partners whose money is invested. 
Typically angel investors do not have a group of professionals to evaluate and scrutinize 
solicitations. I argue that one of the outcomes of these, and other, dissimilarities between 
the two investors’ types, results in their different ability to interpret the signals they 
receive from the startups. Furthermore, I suggest that organizations with relatively lower 
abilities of signal interpretation are more likely to rely on the legitimizing aspect of the 
signal in their decision making. Hence, I argue angel investors’ decisions are more likely 
to be influenced by the legitimizing aspect of the signal when compared to VC 
investment decisions. On the other hand, VC investment decisions are more likely to be 
influenced by the informative aspect of the signal. 
 
To test these arguments I supplemented the solicitation dataset with information 
from reports the startups submitted to the SEC regarding investments and as a result of 
the solicitation efforts. In accordance with regulation D, startups are required to submit a 
description of the investments made in the firm to the SEC, including the number of 
investors and the size of investment. The data within the SEC’s ‘Form D’ allows me to 
discern the investor type, hence the complete dataset enables me to find which aspect of 




Until now, research of interfirm signals has focused on the signal itself and how it 
relates to the underlying quality of the sender. In other words, researchers have tested 
how the senders’ heterogeneity influences the outcome of interactions. At the same time, 
most researchers have ignored the receiver side altogether, especially in empirical 
studies. It appears that for the most part current research of interfirm signaling has 
implicitly assumed all receivers are homogenous. Obviously this assumption is false. 
Receivers are just as likely to be heterogeneous as senders are. While this assumption 
simplifies the problem facing the researcher, it also skews our understanding of the actual 
interaction and detracts from our ability to assist practitioners to manage signals 
strategically. The results of this essay indicate that the receivers’ heterogeneity is an 
important aspect of the signaling interaction and that further research on the influence of 
receiver’s heterogeneity is necessary to improve our understanding of interfirm signaling. 
Looking at competitive settings, Heil and Robertson (1991) proposed that entities with 
higher signal generating capabilities will be also have better signal interpretation 
capabilities. To my knowledge this study is the first attempt to empirically test the 
influence of receiver’s heterogeneity. Moreover, this study, and the suggested theory in 
this dissertation, consider a more generic signaling scenario and are not confined within 
competitive settings (even though, uneven competition can exist in any interaction (Chen, 
1996)).  
 
This study suffers from several limitations. As pointed earlier, there is reason to 
believe the predicting model suffers from multicolinearity. Careful consideration was 
given to establishing which variables are influenced in the analysis. Further remedy may 
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come from increasing the sample size, which is currently pursued. Another limitation 
stems from the definition and identification of angel investors. In this study angels are not 
identified directly, rather all funding events that are not positively identified as VC 
funding are assumed to be angel activities. This is a cause for concern. First, at least some 
of these funding events may be the result of investments by family and friends. This 
problem is tightly tied to the vague definition of angel investors. Currently little is known 
about business angels as a group. It is possible that the population of angel investors is 
inconveniently wide, containing both accredited and non accredited investors, both 
experienced and successful entrepreneurs and wealthy individuals who casually invest in 
startups. In this case we will need to redefine angels to improve our ability to study 
angels empirically. With current events in mind we might see the border between angels 
and VCs becoming even blurrier then before. There is some evidence that due to the 
financial crisis and the continuing difficulties in raising future investment funds, VCs 
recommend to startups in which they invested in the past to go ‘down in the food chain’ 




Table 4.1 - Descriptive statistics for observations that received funding 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
total_offered 212 4,342,092 9,214,734 46,382 100,000,000 
total_sold 213 2,687,481 5,940,511 6,000 54,700,000 
acc_amount 209 3,227,963 9,643,637 6,000 112,000,000 
non_acc_amount 11 160,670.600 227,548.800 12,000 768,776 
avg_invstment 212 336,223.800 929,823.900 `3,286 10,000,000 
avg_acc_investment 209 364,571.100 992,274.700 1,000 10,000,000 
avg_non_acc_investment 11 38,194.280 38,976.580 8,000 128,367 
total_num_investors 212 16.137 22.887 1 170 
acc_investors 211 15.948 22.906 1 170 
non_acc_investors 11 5.091 6.655 1 24 
in_venture_expert 49 1.000 0.000 1 1 
ve_amount 213 958,403.800 4,484,991 0 40,700,000 
ve_num_invst 213 0.343 1.548 0 17 
d_prev_invst 213 0.638 0.482 0 1 
num_of_prev_invstments 213 0.995 1.131 0 10 
prev_inst_amount 213 1,267,248 5,104,425 0 54,700,000 




Table 4.2 - Descriptive statistics 
              
 Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
d_invst 830 0.257 0.437 0 1 
d_vc 830 0.066 0.249 0 1 D
V
 
d_angel 830 0.198 0.398 0 1 
d_bp_es 312 0.795 0.404 0 1 
d_prev_invst 830 0.202 0.402 0 1 
overalldoc 312 3.017 0.905 0 5 
qualpress 312 2.804 1.467 0 5 
d_founder 248 0.855 0.883 0 3 
max_rolls 248 1.359 0.505 1 4 
tmt_degree 248 1.573 1.890 0 9 
ab_n_bod_degree 248 0.419 1.084 0 7 
total_tmt_exp 248 28.734 33.302 0 172 
IV
 
total_bod_exp 248 8.109 15.243 0 104 
nasdaq_close 815 2398.267 842.504 1139.9 5048.62 







yr_qtr 493 2000.019 2.190 1968.1 2008.3 





Table 4.3 - Correlations  
                        
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 d_invst 1                   
2 d_vc 0.3869*** 1         
3 d_angel 0.8446*** -0.1322*** 1        
4 d_bp_es -0.0183 -0.1030* 0.0465 1       
5 d_prev_invst 0.6377*** 0.3359*** 0.5106*** -0.0429 1      
6 overalldoc 0.0628 -0.0292 0.0737 0.3971*** -0.0643 1     
7 qualpress 0.1239** 0.0342 0.1050* 0.4389*** 0.0214 0.6191*** 1    
8 d_founder 0.0539 -0.0977 0.1144* 0.1512** 0.0789 0.1179* 0.1354** 1   
9 max_rolls 0.0594 0.1482** -0.0200 0.1209* 0.0310 0.0980 0.1009 -0.0734 1  
10 tmt_degree -0.0177 -0.0131 -0.0117 0.1185* -0.0624 0.3168*** 0.2472*** 0.2028*** 0.1850*** 1 
11 ab_n_bod_degree 0.0410 0.0611 0.0098 0.0600 -0.0697 0.2640*** 0.1835*** 0.0110 0.1011 0.3211*** 
12 total_tmt_exp -0.0262 0.0207 -0.0403 0.1375** 0.0247 0.2472*** 0.2401*** 0.1114* 0.1371** 0.3181*** 
13 total_bod_exp 0.0168 0.0281 0.0022 0.1135* 0.0560 0.0693 0.1339** 0.0393 0.2046*** 0.0965 
14 nasdaq_close 0.1574*** -0.0255 0.1734*** 0.0018 0.0537 0.0886 0.0311 0.1263** -0.0034 -0.0190 
15 mt_qtr_vc_amount 0.3123*** 0.0361 0.3056*** -0.0304 0.1834*** 0.0885 0.0538 0.0822 -0.0177 -0.0178 
16 yr_qtr 0.0592 0.0446 0.0298 0.0348 0.0211 0.0793 0.1140* -0.0873 0.0767 0.0375 
 * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01        
            
                    
  11 12 13 14 15 16     
11 ab_n_bod_degree 1          
12 total_tmt_exp 0.0334 1         
13 total_bod_exp 0.1881*** 0.4273* 1        
14 nasdaq_close 0.0322 0.0149 -0.0788 1       
15 mt_qtr_vc_amount 0.0406 0.0093 -0.0375 0.9102*** 1      
16 yr_qtr 0.0126 0.1314* 0.0401 -0.0748* -0.1759*** 1     
 * p<0.10 ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01        
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Table 4.4 – logistic regression models 
                       
  model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 model 8 model 9 model 10 
 d_bp_es -0.442                   
  (1.21)          
 d_prev_invst  2.622***         
   (10.15)         
 overalldoc   0.08        
    (0.50)        
 qualpress    0.07       
     (0.66)       
 d_founder     0.161      
      (0.92)      
 max_rolls      0.218     
       (0.68)     
 tmt_degree       -0.018    
        (0.23)    
 ab_n_bod_degree        -0.059   
         (0.43)   
 total_tmt_exp         -0.007  
          (1.35)  
 total_bod_exp          -0.005 
           (0.51) 
 nasdaq_close 0 0.001* 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.96) (1.85) (0.75) (0.75) (1.27) (1.34) (1.27) (1.33) (1.39) (1.31) 
 mt_qtr_vc_invst_amount -0.027 -0.037 -0.014 -0.013 -0.068 -0.072 -0.068 -0.071 -0.075 -0.07 
  (0.56) (1.02) (0.31) (0.29) (1.27) (1.32) (1.27) (1.31) (1.38) (1.30) 
 yr_qtr 0.085 0.198** 0.074 0.072 0.069 0.055 0.054 0.059 0.07 0.062 
  (0.70) (2.50) (0.61) (0.59) (0.51) (0.41) (0.40) (0.44) (0.52) (0.46) 
 _cons -170.948 -397.536** -150.593 -144.84 -140.239 -112.401 -108.645 -120.209 -141.105 -124.624 
  (0.71) (2.51) (0.62) (0.59) (0.52) (0.42) (0.40) (0.45) (0.52) (0.46) 
 N 236 432 236 236 195 195 195 195 195 195 
 ll -143.547 -226.469 -144.137 -144.045 -119.054 -119.245 -119.448 -119.379 -118.52 -119.341 
 chi2 3.239 138.130 2.058 2.242 2.615 2.234 1.828 1.967 3.685 2.043 
 DV: d_invst           
 * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01       
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Table 4.5 – additional logistic regression models 
                 
 model 11 model 12 model 13 model 14 model 15 model 16 model 17 model 18 
d_bp_es -0.173             -0.569 
 (0.43)       (0.96) 
d_prev_invst 2.052***      2.028*** 2.030*** 
 (5.82)      (5.01) (4.99) 
overalldoc  0.026    -0.195 -0.052 0.05 
  (0.13)    (0.81) (0.20) (0.18) 
qualpress  0.059    0.164 0.149 0.153 
  (0.45)    (1.02) (0.86) (0.89) 
d_founder   0.17   0.189 0.083 0.107 
   (0.96)   (1.00) (0.40) (0.51) 
max_rolls   0.239   0.299 0.302 0.317 
   (0.74)   (0.87) (0.81) (0.84) 
tmt_degree    -0.012  0.008 0.031 0.035 
    (0.15)  (0.08) (0.30) (0.34) 
ab_n_bod_degree    -0.055  -0.068 -0.009 -0.022 
    (0.40)  (0.43) (0.05) (0.13) 
total_tmt_exp     -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
     (1.26) (1.33) (1.48) (1.49) 
total_bod_exp     -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.005 
     (0.16) (0.10) (0.43) (0.41) 
nasdaq_close 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.02) (0.74) (1.31) (1.31) (1.40) (1.43) (1.48) (1.59) 
mt_qtr_vc_invst_amount -0.02 -0.013 -0.072 -0.07 -0.075 -0.082 -0.074 -0.082 
 (0.40) (0.29) (1.31) (1.30) (1.39) (1.46) (1.26) (1.39) 
yr_qtr 0.034 0.072 0.069 0.057 0.071 0.093 0.027 0.038 
 (0.25) (0.59) (0.51) (0.42) (0.53) (0.67) (0.18) (0.25) 
_cons -69.396 -145.086 -140.332 -115.754 -143.807 -187.864 -56.883 -78.878 
 (0.26) (0.59) (0.51) (0.43) (0.53) (0.68) (0.19) (0.26) 
N 236 236 195 195 195 193 193 193 
ll -125.018 -144.036 -118.782 -119.367 -118.506 -116.207 -102.357 -101.900 
chi2 40.296 2.260 3.160 1.990 3.712 6.831 34.530 35.444 
DV: d_invst         
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01         
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Table 4.6 – additional logistic regression models 
             
  model 1 a model 2 a model 3 a model 4 a model 5 a model 6 a model 7 a model 8 a model 9 a model 10 a 
 d_bp_es -1.293**          
  (2.38)          
 d_prev_invst  1.932***         
   (5.22)         
 overalldoc   -0.114        
    (0.42)        
 qualpress    -0.055       
     (0.30)       
 d_founder     -0.615      
      (1.58)      
 max_rolls      1.102*     
       (1.85)     
 tmt_degree       -0.092    
        (0.58)    
 ab_n_bod_degree        -0.015   
         (0.06)   
 total_tmt_exp         -0.003  
          (0.38)  
 total_bod_exp          -0.002 
           (0.13) 
 nasdaq_close -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  (0.64) (1.47) (1.01) (1.02) (0.12) (0.24) (0.02) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) 
 mt_qtr_vc_invst_amount 0.037 0.068 0.072 0.073 -0.036 -0.055 -0.032 -0.036 -0.039 -0.036 
  (0.44) (1.31) (0.89) (0.89) (0.35) (0.49) (0.32) (0.36) (0.38) (0.36) 
 yr_qtr 0.032 0.114 0.001 0.001 -0.07 -0.034 -0.041 -0.027 -0.02 -0.025 
  (0.16) (1.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.16) (0.19) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) 
 _cons -64.147 -229.625 -3.801 -4.058 137.607 63.831 79.851 51.106 37.495 47.54 
  (0.17) (1.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.32) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.09) (0.11) 
 N 236 432 236 236 195 195 195 195 195 195 
 ll -57.87 -121.621 -60.389 -60.432 -45.957 -45.644 -47.235 -47.414 -47.338 -47.407 
 chi2 6.446 36.75 1.409 1.322 3.609 4.235 1.052 0.696 0.846 0.709 
 DV: d_vc           
 * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01        
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Table 4.7 – additional logistic regression models 
            
  model 11 a model 12 a model 13 a model 14 a model 15 a model 16 a model 17 a model 18 a 
  d_bp_es -1.095*       -1.278 
  (1.93)       (1.43) 
 d_prev_invst 1.611***      1.965*** 1.781** 
  (3.01)      (2.79) (2.49) 
 overalldoc  -0.103    -0.094 0.222 0.504 
   (0.30)    (0.20) (0.46) (0.97) 
 qualpress  -0.012    0.11 0.062 0.044 
   (0.05)    (0.35) (0.19) (0.14) 
 d_founder   -0.601   -0.548 -0.830* -0.786* 
    (1.53)   (1.34) (1.78) (1.66) 
 max_rolls   1.076*   1.182* 1.306* 1.286* 
    (1.79)   (1.86) (1.92) (1.89) 
 tmt_degree    -0.093  -0.077 -0.05 -0.036 
     (0.58)  (0.41) (0.27) (0.19) 
 ab_n_bod_degree    0.012  -0.053 -0.021 -0.049 
     (0.05)  (0.20) (0.07) (0.17) 
 total_tmt_exp     -0.003 0 -0.002 0 
      (0.36) (0.02) (0.14) (0.01) 
 total_bod_exp     -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 
      (0.04) (0.34) (0.18) (0.25) 
 nasdaq_close 0 -0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  (0.60) (1.01) (0.19) (0.02) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.03) 
 mt_qtr_vc_invst_amount 0.038 0.072 -0.048 -0.032 -0.039 -0.05 -0.001 -0.014 
  (0.46) (0.89) (0.42) (0.31) (0.38) (0.44) (-0.01) (0.13) 
 yr_qtr -0.02 0.002 -0.094 -0.042 -0.019 -0.092 -0.268 -0.229 
  (0.10) (0.01) (0.43) (0.19) (0.09) (0.41) (1.06) (0.90) 
 _cons 37.847 -4.476 185.366 81.167 36.341 180.846 530.872 452.459 
  (0.09) (0.01) (0.42) (0.19) (0.08 (0.40) (1.05) (0.89) 
  N 236 236 195 195 195 193 193 193 
 ll -53.337 -60.387 -44.29 -47.234 -47.338 -43.831 -39.771 -38.79 
  chi2 15.512 1.411 6.942 1.054 0.848 7.583 15.703 17.666 
 DV: d_vc         
 * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01      
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Table 4.8 – additional logistic regression models 
                       
  model 1 b model 2 b model 3 b model 4 b model 5 b model 6 b model 7 b model 8 b model 9 b model 10 b 
 d_bp_es 0.107                   
  (0.25)          
 d_prev_invst  1.778***         
   (7.70)         
 overalldoc   0.145        
    (0.82)        
 qualpress    0.103       
     (0.89)       
 d_founder     0.368*      
      (1.94)      
 max_rolls      -0.138     
       (0.39)     
 tmt_degree       0.009    
        (0.10)    
 ab_n_bod_degree        -0.065   
         (0.44)   
 total_tmt_exp         -0.007  
          (1.23)  
 total_bod_exp          -0.005 
           (0.48) 
 nasdaq_close 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (1.37) (2.68) (1.38) (1.38) (1.29) (1.32) (1.35) (1.38) (1.43) (1.36) 
 mt_qtr_vc_invst_amount -0.042 -0.062* -0.042 -0.041 -0.067 -0.066 -0.068 -0.07 -0.073 -0.069 
  (0.81) (1.76) (0.81) (0.79) (1.14) (1.14) (1.17) (1.20) (1.26) (1.19) 
 yr_qtr 0.089 0.125 0.088 0.084 0.111 0.08 0.081 0.082 0.092 0.084 
  (0.64) (1.64) (0.63) (0.60) (0.71) (0.53) (0.53) (0.55) (0.61) (0.56) 
 _cons -179.52 -252.112* -178.49 -169.907 -223.397 -162.382 -163.374 -166.311 -184.988 -170.614 
  (0.65) (1.66) (0.64) (0.61) (0.72) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.62) (0.56) 
 N 236 432 236 236 195 195 195 195 195 195 
 ll -126.219 -238.095 -125.91 -125.852 -104.842 -106.654 -106.726 -106.632 -105.933 -106.613 
 chi2 3.829 73.759 4.446 4.562 5.697 2.072 1.929 2.117 3.515 2.155 
 DV: d_angel        
 * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01        
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Table 4.9 – additional logistic regression models 
                   
  model 11 b model 12 b model 13 b model 14 b model 15 b model 16 b model 17 b model 18 b 
  d_bp_es 0.404       0.081 
  (0.89)       (0.13) 
 d_prev_invst 1.636***      1.574*** 1.576*** 
  (4.57)      (3.94) (3.94) 
 overalldoc  0.08    -0.173 -0.065 -0.08 
   (0.36)    (-0.66) (-0.24) (-0.27) 
 qualpress  0.072    0.144 0.131 0.131 
   (0.50)    (0.83) (0.72) (0.73) 
 d_founder   0.365*   0.372* 0.312 0.309 
    (1.92)   (1.83) (1.44) (1.41) 
 max_rolls   -0.094   -0.066 -0.113 -0.11 
    (-0.26)   (-0.18) (-0.28) (-0.28) 
 tmt_degree    0.017  0.036 0.055 0.054 
     (0.19)  (0.35) (0.52) (0.51) 
 ab_n_bod_degree    -0.071  -0.063 -0.009 -0.007 
     (-0.46)  (-0.36) (-0.05) (-0.04) 
 total_tmt_exp     -0.006 -0.009 -0.01 -0.01 
      (-1.14) (-1.39) (-1.45) (-1.45) 
 total_bod_exp     -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
      (-0.15) (0.05) (-0.24) (-0.25) 
 nasdaq_close 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (1.43) (1.37) (1.26) (1.39) (1.43) (1.39) (1.46) (1.44) 
 mt_qtr_vc_invst_amount -0.036 -0.04 -0.066 -0.071 -0.073 -0.077 -0.071 -0.07 
  (-0.68) (-0.79) (-1.12) (-1.21) (-1.26) (-1.27) (-1.16) (-1.13) 
 yr_qtr 0.047 0.084 0.11 0.085 0.093 0.135 0.098 0.097 
  (0.32) (0.60) (0.71) (0.56) (0.62) (0.87) (0.59) (0.58) 
 _cons -97.164 -171.035 -222.865 -172.558 -187.854 -273.034 -199.625 -196.759 
  (-0.33) (-0.61) (-0.72) (-0.57) (-0.62) (-0.87) (-0.59) (-0.58) 
  N 236 236 195 195 195 193 193 193 
 ll -115.601 -125.787 -104.808 -106.614 -105.921 -102.782 -94.903 -94.895 
  chi2 25.065 4.693 5.766 2.153 3.539 8.708 24.464 24.482 
 DV: d_angel       
 * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01      
 
 122 
Table 4.10 – additional logistic regression models 
                       
  model 1 c model 2 c model 3 c model 4 c model 5 c model 6 c model 7 c model 8 c model 9 c model 10 c 
 d_bp_es -1.341**                   
  (2.03)          
 d_prev_invst  0.658*         
   (1.67)         
 overalldoc   -0.22        
    (0.71)        
 qualpress    -0.139       
     (0.70)       
 d_founder     -0.965**      
      (2.16)      
 max_rolls      1.250*     
       (1.83)     
 tmt_degree       -0.092    
        (0.54)    
 ab_n_bod_degree        0.04   
         (0.12)   
 total_tmt_exp         0.001  
          (0.13)  
 total_bod_exp          0.004 
           (0.17) 
 nasdaq_close -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 0 
  (0.96) (1.92) (1.24) (1.26) (0.25) (0.78) (0.59) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) 
 mt_qtr_vc_invst_amount 0.042 0.081 0.074 0.073 -0.009 0.063 0.034 0.017 0.015 0.016 
  (0.44) (1.48) (0.84) (0.82) (0.07) (0.50) (0.29) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) 
 yr_qtr -0.186 0.016 -0.139 -0.121 -0.383 -0.223 -0.206 -0.129 -0.127 -0.142 
  (0.64) (0.12) (0.49) (0.43) (1.12) (0.71) (0.61) (0.42) (0.42) (0.45) 
 _cons 374.567 -31.948 280.111 242.244 766.114 445.331 412.391 257.813 254.57 284.751 
  (0.65) (0.12) (0.49) (0.43) (1.12) (0.70) (0.61) (0.42) (0.42) (0.45) 
 N 72 187 72 72 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 ll -36.059 -96.409 -37.869 -37.876 -28.096 -29.142 -30.767 -30.908 -30.906 -30.901 
 chi2 6.586 8.847 2.965 2.952 6.526 4.435 1.184 0.903 0.906 0.917 
 DV: d_ba_vc           
 * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01        
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Table 4.11 – additional logistic regression models 
                    
  model 11 c model 12 c model 13 c model 14 c model 15 c model 16 c model 17 c model 18 c 
  d_bp_es -1.310*             -1.56 
  (1.88)       (1.35) 
 d_prev_invst 0.086      0.163 -0.025 
  (0.14)      (0.21) (0.03) 
 overalldoc  -0.14    0.614 0.62 0.877 
   (0.36)    (1.01) (1.01) (1.37) 
 qualpress  -0.085    -0.335 -0.328 -0.216 
   (0.34)    (0.78) (0.76) (0.50) 
 d_founder   -1.018**   -1.255** -1.260** -1.342** 
    (2.16)   (2.05) (2.05) (2.02) 
 max_rolls   1.346*   2.064** 2.026** 1.978* 
    (1.84)   (2.10) (2.04) (1.93) 
 tmt_degree    -0.115  -0.23 -0.216 -0.186 
     (0.62)  (0.88) (0.80) (0.67) 
 ab_n_bod_degree    0.123  0.261 0.248 0.21 
     (0.34)  (0.60) (0.57) (0.45) 
 total_tmt_exp     0.001 0.012 0.011 0.014 
      (0.07) (0.74) (0.72) (0.86) 
 total_bod_exp     0.003 0.022 0.021 0.024 
      (0.13) (0.67) (0.63) (0.67) 
 nasdaq_close -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.95) (1.23) (0.68) (0.66) (0.45) (1.40) (1.32) (1.23) 
 mt_qtr_vc_invst_amount 0.041 0.071 0.053 0.047 0.016 0.184 0.177 0.163 
  (0.44) (0.80) (0.40) (0.38) (0.14) (1.17) (1.11) (0.98) 
 yr_qtr -0.184 -0.13 -0.514 -0.228 -0.14 -0.935* -0.920* -1.003** 
  (0.64) (0.46) (1.44) (0.66) (0.44) (1.95) (1.91) (2.00) 
 _cons 370.414 261.483 1026.694 456.209 278.798 1869.751* 1839.274* 2004.478** 
  (0.64) (0.46) (1.44) (0.65) (0.44) (1.95) (1.91) (2.00) 
  N 72 72 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 ll -36.05 -37.811 -26.297 -30.71 -30.898 -24.633 -24.61 -23.661 
  chi2 6.605 3.083 10.126 1.299 0.923 13.454 13.498 15.397 
 DV: d_ba_vc         
 * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01      
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Appendix 4 A – The SEC’s definition of Accredited Investor 
 
Under the Securities Act of 1933, a company that offers or sells its securities must 
register the securities with the SEC or find an exemption from the registration 
requirements. The Act provides companies with a number of exemptions. For some of the 
exemptions, such as rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D, a company may sell its securities 
to what are known as "accredited investors."  
The federal securities laws define the term accredited investor in Rule 501 of Regulation 
D as: 
1. a bank, insurance company, registered investment company, business 
development company, or small business investment company;  
2. an employee benefit plan, within the meaning of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, if a bank, insurance company, or registered investment 
adviser makes the investment decisions, or if the plan has total assets in excess of 
$5 million;  
3. a charitable organization, corporation, or partnership with assets exceeding $5 
million;  
4. a director, executive officer, or general partner of the company selling the 
securities;  
5. a business in which all the equity owners are accredited investors;  
6. a natural person who has individual net worth, or joint net worth with the person’s 
spouse, that exceeds $1 million at the time of the purchase;  
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7. a natural person with income exceeding $200,000 in each of the two most recent 
years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years and a 
reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year; or  
8. a trust with assets in excess of $5 million, not formed to acquire the securities 
offered, whose purchases a sophisticated person makes.  
For more information about the SEC’s registration requirements and common 




Appendix 4 B – Revenue Models  
Revenue Model Explanations: Examples* 
Commission-based Inst-cash International 
 
A fee that is imposed on a transaction by 
a third party (usually an intermediary) Unibarter.com 
Fee-for-Service Metalogics, Inc. 
 
Pay as you go option, charged for 




Business of attracting public attention to 
a good or service, achieved through 





Company charges a flat rate to use a 




Fees for steering customers to another 
company, can be either a flat fee or a fee 
per click-through.  
Production Games Interactive 
 
Manufacturer sells directly over the 
Internet, cuts out middleman. 100x.com 
Mark-up Based RealLegends.com 
 
The Middleman, business not in 
production but in resale. Smartenergy 
Other Avatar Project 
  
  
Either not enough information to 
classify, or the revenue model was 
outside the scheme of an Internet 
Business.   







CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
 
 
This dissertation takes a new look at the structure of interfirm signaling and the 
role of signal receivers’ heterogeneity on the interpretation of signals. Prior research has 
shown several types of signals significantly influence decision making. I suggest that 
these studies took a simplifying approach to signal structure and separated each signal 
into several signals. This approach has been useful for illuminating certain aspects of 
signals. However, I argue that to fully understand how signals influence decisions the 
researcher should acknowledge that each signal conveys a complex message. Every 
signal delivers both an informative and a legitimizing message from the sender to the 
receiver. If, for example, we take Spence’s (1973) classical example of job market 
signaling: when a job applicant informs a potential employer of his education, his signal 
has both an informative component and a legitimizing one. The subject area, level of 
degree and grades provide for the employer a direct, informational signal about the 
underlying potential of the candidate. At the same time, the institution in which the 
degree was received, its reputation as a school and propensity to send graduates to the 
receivers’ arena creates an indirect, legitimizing signal about the job candidate. In 
addition to demonstrating the signal’s multi aspect structure, this example also exhibits 
the multiple layers in the signal’s structure. At the initial layer, the applicant’s resume 
format is the legitimizing aspect while the information within is the informative aspect of 
the signal. One layer deeper are the topical sections such as education, experience, and 
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personal, each providing both aspects as shown above. While past research focus on 
single aspects of signals was useful in conducting empirical studies it currently limits our 
understanding of signals. I believe that research in this area is important to anyone who 
participates in actual signaling. Exploring the complexity of signal can help senders to 
design more effective signals and receivers to weight on the limitations of depending 
more heavily on one aspect of the signal. 
 
Previous studies of signaling also tended to focus on one side of the sender-
receiver dyad – the signaler. This limitation might stem from the nature of the data 
available for research and was useful in advancing research. This study considers both 
sides in an attempt to improve our understanding of signaling interaction. With the 
perspective that signals are multifaceted and multilayered in hand, I argue that the 
combination of the sender’s abilities to generate signals and the receiver’s abilities in 
interpreting these signals will determine which aspect of the signal will be more 
influential in the decision making process.  
 
Another goal of this dissertation is to extend our understanding of the challenges 
startups face with regards to outsider. Specifically I am interested in the interaction 
between startups and private equity investors. The four sender-receiver ability dyads 
create a potential explanation to the time segmentation of investments in nascent 
organizations and in particular the typology of the private equity investments market. The 
ability of a young startup to provide effective signals is limited by the scarcity of its 
accomplishments and immaturity of its organizational structure when compared to older 
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startups. Additionally, there is a clear distinction between the investors’ types at different 
stages of the startup’s life. Research shows that, initially, nascent ventures receive 
funding only from friends and family, i.e. non professional investors. Furthermore, 
among professional private equity investors, such as venture capital firms, tend to invest 
in ventures that are older and solicit larger amounts than do individual angel investors 
(Ibrahim, 2007; Wilmerding, 2003). Last, investment banks and institutional investors 
typically wait until the startup is close to becoming public or actually offer shares in an 
IPO. Since decision makers focus their attention on alternatives they believe they can 
control (March & Shapira, 1987, 1992) the type of investor an organization can expect to 
solicit successfully at any given time may depend on the structure of the signal the 
organization can emit at any point of time.  
 
In the first empirical study I demonstrate how the legitimizing aspect of the signal 
becomes prominent when the receiver’s ability to interpret the signal is limited. I find that 
social mediation is strongly associated with catching the attention of decision makers at 
the VC’s initial screen, a stage when the VC can not afford to spend much of its 
resources. Several findings in this study add to extant entrepreneurship literature. A 
recent study of investment selection found that internal investment decisions made by the 
founders of firms were based on perceptions while consequent investment decisions 
made by external investors were based on objective information (Eckhardt, Shane and 
Delmar, 2006). The findings suggest that this separation is contextual and that the initial 
selection conducted by external investors may be similarly based on legitimacy rather 
than information. Second, I find that startups that interacted directly with members of the 
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VC firm prior to submitting a solicitation were more likely to pass the selection stage 
than were startups who submitted their solicitations indirectly. The results show that 
having a direct connection to the decision makers is more important than prestige as 
measured by external referral. This is potentially an important finding for entrepreneurs, 
startups, and other organizations with lower levels of social capital. From a tactical 
perspective, this finding implies that when seeking access to a potential venture backer, 
an entrepreneur will be better served asking for an introduction rather than a referral of a 
business plan.  
 
I also find that high demand for attention resources reduces the influence of a 
referral on the probability of being selected. Moreover, under conditions of high demand 
for attention, I find that externally-mediated solicitations were more subject to this effect 
than were those that arrived through internal channels. It is possible that VCs use the 
preceding interaction with the entrepreneur as an interview, thus adding an additional 
screen to the venture selection process. The solicitation of funds would therefore indicate 
that the entrepreneur had already succeeded in passing the first selection hurdle. 
 
In the second empirical chapter I test if receivers differ in their utilization of the 
received signal. To accomplish this I utilize a new large dataset of investment 
solicitations from nascent ventures. The study compares two types of private equity 
investors: VCs and business angels. Research shows these segments differ on several 
characteristics. For example, angel investors are wealthy individuals investing their own 
money while VCs are limited partnerships where the managers who make the investment 
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decisions are not the partners whose money is invested. I argue that one of the outcomes 
of this, and other, dissimilarities between the two investors’ types, results in their 
different ability to interpret the signals they receive from the startups. This allows me to 
test my proposition that organizations with relatively lower signal interpretation abilities 
are more likely to rely on the legitimizing aspect of the signal in their decision making, 
and that organizations with higher signal interpretation abilities will be influenced by the 
informative aspect of the signal. The study’s results support these arguments. I show that 
angel investors’ decisions are influenced by the legitimizing aspect of the signal while 
VC investment decisions are influenced by the informative aspect. These findings 
contribute to the development of signaling theory and our understandings of the 
differences between business angels and VCs. 
 
The research in this dissertation can be expanded in several directions. First, the 
influence of receivers’ heterogeneity should be explored in depth. Future studies can 
compare how different potential stakeholders of the startup, such as investors and 
employees, respond to signals. This will further our understanding of when signals should 
be strategic, and when spending resources to generate a better signal should be avoided. 
Further attention should also be given to the influence of the signal’s aspect on single 
type of investors. Such a study could revisit Higgins and Gulati’s studies of the 
interaction between startups preparing for an IPO and the underwriting banks supporting 
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